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DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
I INTRODUCTION
By its very nature, aviation is inherently international in character,
shrinking the planet and drawing together disparate peoples, cultures, and
economies. As aircraft cross borders into foreign airspace and land at foreign
airports, conflicts inevitably arise at both commercial and political levels. It
is the resolution of these disputes that is the focus of this Article.
International dispute settlement mechanisms exist along a spectrum.
Coercive means exist at one end, while legal means exist at the other.' This
Article focuses on the latter, and in particular, the ad hoc arbitrations that have
resolved commercial aviation disputes, as well as the adjudication of aviation
disputes before the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),2 and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).3
1 Dimtri Maniatis, Conflict In the Skies: The Settlement ofInternationalAviation Disputes,
20 ANNALS AIR & SPAcE L. 167, 170, 172,185-206 (1995). More formally, negotiation, which
offers the parties "the greatest degree of flexibility and control over their dispute," stands at one
end of the spectrum. Adjudication stands at the other, inasmuch as it requires the parties to
relinquish the highest degree of control over their dispute to a third party. Between negotiation
and adjudication are a variety of options, including inquiry, good offices, mediation,
conciliation, and arbitration. Though these categories are quite distinct, many dispute settlement
mechanisms do not fall precisely within a single category. A. Neil Craik, Recalcitrant Reality
and Chosen Ideals: The Public Function of Dispute Settlement in International Environmental
Law, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvT'LL REV. 551, 553 (1998).
2 The International Civil Aviation Organization was created under the terms of the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180 (1944) [hereinafter Chicago
Convention]. This agreement was ratified by the United States in August 1946 and has been
ratified or adhered to by 188 nations-virtually the entire world community. It is permanently
headquartered in Montreal.
I To date, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has yet to exert jurisdiction over
commercial aviation. See Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Would Competition in Commercial
Aviation Ever Fit Into the World Trade Organization?, 61 J. AIRL. &COM. 793 (1996). At this
writing, only three sectors of aviation activity have been brought under the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) Annex on Air Transport Services: (1) aircraft repair and
maintenance; (2) the sale and marketing of air transport services; and (3) computer reservations
systems. For an argument that more should be swept under the GATS umbrella, see Randall
Lehner, Protectionism, Prestige and National Security: TheAlliance Against Multilateral Trade
in International Air Transport, 45 DuKE L.J. 436 (1995), though others argue that an agency
with aviation expertise would be better suited to resolve such disputes. See PAUL DEMPSEY,
LAW & FOREIGN POuCY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 302 (1987).
Although the WTO has not addressed commercial airlines, it has rendered several
decisions regarding aircraft finance subsidies by manufacturers. See, e.g., Brazil-Export
Financing Programme For Aircraft: Second Recourse By Canada To Article 21.5 of the DSU,
Wt/Ds46/Rw/2; (01-3570), 2001 WTO Ds Lexis 37 (26 July 2001); Brazil-Export Financing
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Bilateral air transport agreements (bilaterals) define legal rights between
nations in the realm of commercial aviation. Rights and responsibilities
defined therein concerning airline traffic rights, rates, capacity, safety,
security, and competition often lead to conflict between signatory states. Most
bilaterals require consultation by governments over disputes before any
retaliatory action is taken. Early bilaterals called for an advisory report or
adjudication by the ICAO. The Chicago Convention also provides for dispute
resolution before the ICAO Council. Modem bilaterals have replaced the
ICAO as a dispute resolution forum with ad hoc arbitration, usually with three
arbitrators.4 Bilaterals typically call for termination only on twelve months'
prior notice.
In the history of international aviation, relatively few disputes have resulted
in ad hoc arbitration or ICAO or ICJ adjudication.5 At this writing, only six
aviation disputes have been submitted to arbitration, only five have been
submitted to the ICAO for adjudication, and only twelve have been filed with
the ICJ. Most aviation disputes are resolved through negotiation, and,
depending on the relative strength of the aviation trading partners, unilateral
6coercion.
This Article will review the six ad hoc arbitrations that have been sought
to resolve issues of commercial aviation:
* United States v. France (1963)-involving fifth freedom7
rights beyond Paris;
* United States v. Italy (1965)-involving all-cargo service to
Rome;
Programme for Aircraft, Recourse By Canada To Article 21.5 Of The DSU, Wt/Ds46/Rw; (00-
1749), 2000 WTO Ds Lexis 14 (9 May 2000); Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, Wt/Ds70tR; (99-1398), 1999 WTO Ds Lexis 6 (14 April 1999). In this bitter
and protracted dispute over subsidies to Embraer and Bombardier by Brazil and Canada,
respectively, the WTO first found that Canada could impose $1.4 billion in retaliatory sanctions
against Brazil, then subsequently found that Brazil could impose $250 million in retaliatory
sanctions against Canada. Tom Cohen, WTO Approves Brazil Sanctions On Canada Over
Airline Subsidies, MEMPwS CoMM. APPEAL, Dec. 24, 2002, at B 11.
' Typically, each nation designates one arbitrator, after which the first two arbitrators jointly
select the third.
' For a review of each of these disputes, see DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 259-67, 293-302.
6 See DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 167-229, 306-07.
' Under "fifth freedom" rights, an airline has the right to carry traffic between two countries
outside its own country of registry so long as the flight originates or terminates in its own
country of registry.
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* United States v. France (1978)-involving "change of
gauge"8 operations between London and Paris;
" Belgium v. Ireland (1981)-involving airline capacity
between Dublin and Brussels;
" United States v. United Kingdom (1992)-involving airline
user charges at London Heathrow Airport; and
" Australia v. United States (1993)-involving fifth freedom
operations between Osaka and Sydney.
This Article will also review the five aviation disputes that have been
brought before the ICAO Council for quasi-judicial resolution:
" India v. Pakistan (1952)-involving Pakistan's refusal to
allow Indian commercial aircraft to fly over Pakistan;
" United Kingdom v. Spain (1969)-involving Spain's restric-
tion of air space at Gibraltar;
" Pakistan v. India (1971)-involving India's refusal to allow
Pakistani commercial aircraft to fly over India, later appealed
to the ICJ;
" Cuba v. United States (1998)-involving the U.S. refusal to
allow Cuba's commercial aircraft to fly over the United
States; and
" United States v. Fifteen European States (2003)-involving
European Union (EU) noise emission regulations.
Finally, this Article will review the dozen aviation disputes that have been
brought before the ICJ:
" United States v. U.S.S.R, and United States v. Hungary
(1954)-involving the treatment in Hungary of U. S. Air Force
aircraft and crew;
" Israel v. Bulgaria, United States v. Bulgaria, and United
Kingdom v. Bulgaria (1955)-involving the destruction of an
El Al civilian aircraft by Bulgarian military jets;
" United States v. Czechoslovakia (1956)-involving the
destruction of a U.S. military jet over Czechoslovakia;
'Vhange of gauge" operations involve the transfer of passengers between aircraft at a
foreign point for a through journey.
20041
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
" UnitedStates v. U.S.S.R. (1956)-involving the destruction of
a U.S. military jet by the Soviet Air Force;
* UnitedStates v. U.S.S.R. (1958)-involving thedestruction of
a U.S. military jet by the Soviet Air Force;
* United States v. U.S.S.R. (1 959)-involving the destruction of
a U.S. military jet by the Soviet Air Force;
* Libya v. United States (1992)-involving the U.S. and United
Kingdom decision to prosecute Libyan nationals for the
destruction of Pan Am flight 103;
* Iran v. United States (1996)-involving the U.S.S.
Vincennes' destruction of Iran Air flight 655; and
" Pakistan v. India (2000)-involving the destruction by India
of a Pakistani military aircraft.
IT. ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION DISPUTES
A. Bilateral Air Transport Agreements
Bilateral air transport agreements are international trade agreements in
which the governmental aviation authorities of two nations establish a
regulatory mechanism for the performance of commercial air services between
their respective territories9 and, often, beyond.'" Bilaterals may be concluded
as treaties, inter-governmental agreements, executive agreements, conventions,
protocols, or exchanges of diplomatic notes. Essentially, they are contracts
between governments." The importance of these agreements becomes
' Most U.S. bilaterals define territory as "the land areas under the sovereignty, suzerainty,
protection, jurisdiction or trusteeship of that State, and territorial waters adjacent thereto." See,
e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Art. 1 (n) (July 23, 1977), CCH Avi. I 26,540c,
and Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Singapore Art. 1(j) (Apr. 8, 1977), CCH Avi. I126,495a. The language tracts
somewhat the language of Article 2 of the Chicago Convention of 1944.
'0 The term "and beyond" refers to those bilaterals which provide for an exchange of so-
called "fifth freedom" rights.
" Such agreements need not, however, be of a formal character, for international law
imposes no requirement that they be in writing. BIN CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT 465 (1962) [hereinafter B. CHENG]. An excellent resource tool for the study of U.S.
bilaterals is AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, PROVISIONS IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT
AGREEMENTS (1985), a three volume compilation [hereinafter ATA U.S. PROVISIONS], and 3
CCH Aviation Law Reporter. See also, Joseph Gertler, Bermuda Air Transport Agreements:
[Vol. 32:231
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manifest when one realizes the tremendous impact of international commercial
aviation upon world commerce and global communications.
From its inception, commercial air transportation has been regulated to
some degree by bilateral agreements between sovereign nations, the first being
an aerial navigation agreement between France and Germany entered into in
1913.2 World War I revealed the commercial and military potential of air
transport; in the years following the war, however, only government subsidies
and mail contracts sustained the economic viability of the fledgling industry. 3
In order to establish and define the basic legal framework for international
aviation, the Peace Conference of 1919 produced the Convention Relating to
the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, more commonly known as the Paris
Convention. 4 Article I thereof declared that each state enjoys "complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."' 5 Henceforth,
transit and landing rights for foreign carriers on international routes would be
conditioned upon the explicit or tacit approval of the national governments in
or above whose territory they would operate. This principle of territorial
sovereignty, coupled with the vital economic support already provided by
governmental authorities, insured that national governments would play a
dominant role in the emerging political and economic development of
international civil aviation.
The Chicago Convention, the formal agreement executed at the conclusion
of the Chicago Conference in 1944, reaffirmed the international legal
principles embraced by the Paris Convention twenty-five years earlier, stating
that "every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory,"' 6 and therefore "[n]o scheduled international air service
Non Bermuda Reflections, 42 1. AIR L. & COM. 779, 781 (1976). In the absence of a formal
written agreement, comity and reciprocity may form the foundation of aviation relations between
two countries.
12 PETER HAANAPPEL, PRICING AND CAPACITY DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT 25 (1984) [hereinafter PRICING AND CAPACITY].
13 ANTHONY SAMPSON, EMPIRES OF THE SKY: THE POLrnCS, CONTESTS AND CARTELS OF
WORLD AIRUNEs 24 (1984); PAUL DEMPSEY & LAURENCE GESEu.. AIR TRANSPORTATION:
FOUNDATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 21, 98 (1997).
" Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S.
173 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
I' l art. 1.
16 Id. art. 1. B. CHENG, supra note 11, at 3; ANTHONY SAMPSON, EMPIRES OFTHE SKY: THE
POLriTCS, CONTESTS AND CARTELS OF WORLD AiRtNEs 69-70 (1984); Michael Milde, The
Chicago Convention-After Forty Years, 9 ANNALS AIR&SPACEL. 119, 121-22 (1984) (citation
omitted).
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may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with
the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance
with the terms of such permission or authorization."' 7 Accordingly, the United
States and other aviation powers entered into a series of bilateral negotiations
with a number of foreign governments with the objective of concluding air
transport agreements which would secure important landing rights abroad for
their international carriers.s
The post-World War II era saw explosive proliferation of bilaterals,
beginning with Bermuda I between the United States and United Kingdom in
1946. Bermuda I became the prototype for bilaterals throughout the world
over the next thirty years. 9 In addition to representing an essential compro-
mise between the world's two leading civil aviation powers, Bermuda I
reinforced the role of national governments in formulating international civil
aviation policy.2'
" Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 6; see Barry Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement
Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and Future of Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 41 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 419, 412-22 (1975); see also Brian Havel, The Constitution in an Era of
SupranationalAdjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257 (2000) (referring to the "mercantilist Chicago
Convention," though Havel nowhere explains why he believes the Convention to be
mercantilist). Actually, the Chicago Conference that produced the Chicago Convention also
drafted companion Transit and Transport Agreements, the latter of which would have
significantly advanced the Open Skies objectives had it been endorsed by a sufficient number
of states to enter into force. The Chicago Convention itself deals only peripherally with
economic issues, and instead focuses on safety, navigation and security, creating the ICAO to
oversee such issues.
" In spite of their failure to reach consensus on a multilateral means of economic regulation,
nations attending the Chicago Conference succeeded in adopting a Form of Standard Agreement
for Provisional Air Routes as a model for future bilateral air transport agreements between
nations. Despite the proliferation of these early agreements, however, it soon became evident
that the Standard Chicago Agreement would not serve as the dominant model for future bilateral
air transport agreements. That role would be reserved for the bilateral concluded between the
United States and Great Britain two years later, the so-called Bermuda I Agreement. Air
Services Agreement with the United Kingdom, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K. 60 Stat. 1499
[hereinafter Bermuda 1].
"9 Peter Haanappel, Bilateral Air Transport Agreements-1913-1980, 5 INT'L TRADE L.J.
241 (1980).
Prior to 1946, the Chicago Conference had already drafted a Form of Standard Agreement,
for provisional air routes. Most of the world's bilaterals are not, however, patterned on this latter
Form of Standard Agreement, but rather on the 1946 Bermuda Agreement. McGill Center for
Research of Air & Space Law, LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
CANADIAN AIR TRANSPORT 522 (1980); SAMPSON, supra note 13, at 72.
20 See generally NICHOLAS MATEESCOMATrE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAW 229-
50(1981).
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Bilaterals concluded by the United States with other nations typically
address six major issues: (1) entry (designation of carriers and routes); (2)
capacity; (3) rates; (4) discrimination and fair competition; (5) security; and
(6) dispute resolution.21 It is the last of these categories that is of relevance to
the instant discussion.22
The Bermuda I bilateral contains several provisions relating to the
settlement of disputes. Article 8 of the agreement provides that either nation
may request consultation between the aeronautical authorities of both nations
in the event that it considers it desirable to modify the terms of the annex of
the agreement (i.e., routes to be operated on by carriers designated by each
nation and rates to be charged by such carriers). Article 13 of the agreement
provides that either nation may request consultations with the other for the
purpose of initiating amendments either to the agreement itself or to the annex
"which may be desirable in the light of experience;"' pending the outcome of
such consultation, either party is free to give notice to the other of its desire to
terminate the agreement.2 4 If notice to renounce is given by either party, the
bilateral will terminate one year after such notice is received by the other
party, unless such notice is subsequently withdrawn.2 After such notice
expires and the bilateral is renounced, air operations may continue under
principles of comity and reciprocity.'
Article 9 of the agreement contains perhaps the most important dispute
settlement provision. In the event that any dispute between the parties relating
to the interpretation or application of the agreement cannot be settled through
consultation, Article 9 requires that such a dispute be referred to the
[P]ICAO.27 The [P]ICAO, in turn, would consider the dispute and issue an
21 The present discussion analyzes only the more important provisions found in modem
bilaterals. Such agreements typically contain a number of additional provisions which address
a wide array of subjects. For a listing of other provisions typically included in modem bilaterals,
see BETSY GDwrrz, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 153-54 (1980).
2 Briefly, Bermuda I called for consultations between the aggrieved governments and
reference to the ICAO for an advisory report. Termination of the bilateral could be only upon
one year's notice. Bermuda I, supra note 18. Bermuda I is reprinted in PAUL DEMPSEY, LAW
& FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 419-24 (1987).
1 Bermuda 1, supra note 18, art. 13.
24 Id.
5 Id.
I Today, a matrix of more than 2,500 bilateral air transport agreements governs the practices
of airlines in international aviation. Only rarely have they been renounced.
27 Bermuda I, supra note 18, art. 9. [P]ICAO refers to the "Provisional" International Civil
Aviation Organization, which came into existence in 1945 on an interim basis with the signing
2004] 239
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"advisory report";2  such a report, however, due to its "advisory" nature, would
not be binding on either party to the agreement.
Professor Bin Cheng has identified three possible approaches to the
settlement of specific types of conflicts arising under bilateral air transport
agreements.29 Under the first approach, all disputes arising under the
agreement are to be settled by negotiation (i.e., consultation); such an approach
of an Interim Agreement at the Chicago Convention, to be replaced by ICAO upon its
formulation in 1947.
28 Id.
" Professor Bin Cheng has discussed in detail the need for timely and effective dispute
settlement mechanisms in international air transportation. See generally Bin Cheng, DISPUTE
SETrLEMENT IN BiLATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS, in SETTLEMENT OF SPACE LAW
DisPUrEs 97 (Karl Heinz Bbckstiegel ed., 1980). Dr. Gertler has acknowledged the potential
danger that "the relief mechanism of bilateral air agreements may be inflexible and too
cumbersome to invoke in situations requiring an urgent corrective measure." Z. Joseph Gertler,
Nationality of Airlines: A Hidden Force in the International Air Regulation Equation, 48 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 51 (1982). Most bilaterals do provide for dispute settlement, most by arbitration. Z.
Joseph Gertler, Bermuda Air Transport Agreements: Non Bermuda Reflections, 42 J. AIR L. &
COM. 779, 820 (1976). Involuntary disruption of air services due to a breakdown in the
interpretation and/or application ofa bilateral may lead to disastrous economic losses, both direct
and indirect, as well as substantial social inconvenience. As a result, bilaterals must contain
mechanisms for both dispute prevention and dispute resolution. Id. Due to the potentially
disastrous economic and social consequences which might stem from a breakdown in aviation
relations, it is clearly preferable to implement a system which recognizes potential problem areas
before they assume the status of full-blown disputes. Essential to any such system, according
to Cheng, is effective communication between parties to the agreement; regular consultations
between the two nations might identify potential difficulties at an early stage and facilitate an
early resolution of the issue. Id.
Professor Cheng has stated that consultation can facilitate at least six different purposes.
Id. First, it can serve as a means for the joint supervision and control by the contracting states
of the "two-tier" operation of the bilateral; consultation enables the states to control and
supervise both the operation of the agreement and the observance of its terms by the designated
airlines. Second, consultation can serve as an appellate jurisdiction in the "two-tier" structure
when changes proposed by the carrier of one state have been disapproved by the other. Id. at
100. Third, consultation can serve as a means of elevating an issue to the international level; it
can enable a contracting state to gather information about a given situation and, if necessary, to
make its own views known to the other state, or to keep the other state informed of a given
situation so that, in the event it decides to do so, it can make its views known. Id. at 102.
Fourth, it can be used for the purpose of reviewing changed circumstances as a matter of good
will. ld at 103. Fifth, consultation can be used for the purpose of changing the bilateral itself.
Id. Finally, it can serve as a means for settling disputes and as a pre-condition to submitting a
dispute to a third party. Id. at 104. This is also an area in which preventive law can play an
important role in diminishing the likelihood of conflict and confrontation between governments
and their commercial enterprises.
240 [Vol. 32:231
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is typically found in the bilaterals of those nations which have traditionally
refused to submit to third-party settlement of disputes.3 ° Under the second
approach, the bilateral provides for a general method for the settlement of
disputes in addition to negotiation, but no specific procedure for specific
disputes.3 Under the third approach, special procedures for the settlement of
certain types of disputes are provided either in the absence of, or in addition
to, a general method of settling all disputes arising under the bilateral.32 An
examination of existing bilaterals concluded by the United States reveals that
most such bilaterals can be classified as containing procedures consistent with
either the second or third approach identified by Professor Cheng.33
In the event that consultation between the parties is unable to produce a
satisfactory settlement, U.S. bilaterals typically provide for resolution via some
form of arbitral or adjudicatory forum. Many early bilaterals, including a
number of U.S. bilaterals currently in force, require that the dispute be referred
to the ICAO for an advisory (i.e., non-binding) report.34
The Bermuda I model ceased to be the template for U.S. aviation negotia-
tions with its "open skies" initiative of the late 1970s. Well before that policy
shift, the strong trend in the post-Bermuda I era reveals a retreat from
designation of the ICAO as a dispute settlement forum; most existing U.S.
bilaterals provide for compulsory arbitration by an ad hoc tribunal.35 In recent
30 Cheng, supra note 29, at 105-06.
"' Id. at 105.
32 Id.
31 Aside from those types of disputes for which some bilaterals specify a certain type of
settlement mechanism, virtually all existing U.S. bilaterals, whether they be of the general pre-
1978 Bermuda I type or the post-1977 type, require that the parties to the dispute first attempt
to settle their differences through some form of consultation. The specific language employed
in the bilateral with respect to consultation varies from agreement to agreement; some U.S.
bilaterals provide merely for "consultations." See, e.g., Protocol Relating to United States Air
Transport Agreement of 1950 U.S.-Isr., Aug. 16, 1978, art. 12, 29 U.S.T. 3144; T.I.A.S. No.
9002.). Others provide for "formal consultations." See, e.g., Agreement on Air Transport
Services, U.S.-Belg., Oct. 23, 1980, art. 17, 32 U.S.T. 3515; T.I.A.S. No. 9903. At least one
agreement provides for "direct negotiations through diplomatic channels." See, e.g., Agreement
on Air Transport Services, U.S.-Rom., July 25, 1979, art. 16, 30 U.S.T. 3872, T.I.A.S.N. 9431.
Although the language of these provisions varies, an identical intent is clearly evident in virtually
all existing U.S. bilaterals, namely, that disputes must first be addressed through consultations
between the contracting parties to the agreement.
' See, e.g., Air Transport Services Agreement, United States-Syria, June 21, 1955, art. 10,
6 U.S.T. 2163, T.I.A.S. No. 3285.
" Some agreements do not require arbitration, however. For example, Article 16 of the
Agreement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China Relating to Civil Air
2004]
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years, efforts have been made in drafting such provisions to make them truly
compulsory by ensuring that neither party can block arbitration by refusing to
cooperate in the establishment of the arbitral tribunal.36 In addition, efforts
have been made to accelerate the arbitral process.37
The typical post-Bermuda I arbitral clause permits each nation to designate
one of three arbitrators who will comprise the arbitral tribunal. The third
arbitrator, who typically may not be a national of either contracting party, is
to be selected by the two arbitrators already chosen.3"
With respect to the decision or award of the arbitral tribunal, most pre- 1978
U.S. bilaterals incorporate language which is non-binding in nature; these
bilaterals typically provide that each nation "shall use its best efforts consistent
with its national law to put into effect" any such decision or award.39 Attempts
have been made in numerous post-1977 liberal bilaterals, however, to make
such decisions or awards truly binding upon both parties. Instead of merely
requiring the "best efforts" of the parties, these newer bilaterals typically
provide that each nation "shall, consistent with its national law, give full effect
to any decision or award of the arbitral tribunal."'' In the event that a nation
Transport provides, inter alia, "the Parties shall, in a spirit of friendly cooperation and mutual
understanding, settle [any dispute arising hereunder] by negotiation or, if the parties so agree,
by mediation, conciliation, or arbitration." 33 U.S.T. 4559, T.I.A.S. No. 10326 (Sept. 17, 1980),
3 CCH Av. L. REP. I 26,255a.
36 Cheng, supra note 29, at 107.
37 Id.
31 While some U.S. bilaterals do not identify procedures to be utilized in the event that either
nation fails to designate an arbitrator or that a third arbitrator cannot be agreed upon, a number
of arbitral clauses provide that either party may request that the president of ICAO or the
president of the ICJ appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators as the case requires. Typically, if the two
designated arbitrators are unable to agree on a third arbitrator, the bilaterals provide that the third
arbitrator shall be appointed by the President of the ICJ (see, e.g., Air Services Agreement
Between the United States and Austria, U.S.-Aus., Mar. 16, 1989, art. 14(2)(b), T.I.A.S. No.
11,265, 3 CCH Av. L. REP. 1 26,210a; Air Transport Agreement Between the United States and
Germany, July 7, 1955, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 13(2), 275 U.S.T. 527, T.I.A.S. No. 3536, or the
President of the ICAO; Air Transport Agreement Between the United States and Canada, art.
17(7)(b) (Feb. 24, 1995), 3 CCH Av. L. REP. I 26,246a; Air Transport Agreement Between the
United States and Costa Rica, art. 14(2)(b) (May 8, 1997), 3 CCH Av. L. REP. 'I 26,264a).
However, some bilaterals are silent on the issue of a deadlock in selecting a third arbitrator,
saying only that that individual "shall not be a national of either contracting party." See, e.g.,
Air Transport Agreement Between the United States and Colombia, Oct. 24, 1956, U.S.-Colom.
art. 12, 14 U.S.T. 429, T.I.A.S. No. 5338.
39 See, e.g., Agreement on Air Transport Services, Aug. 11, 1952, U.S.-Japan. art. 15(3), 4
U.S.T. 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 2854.
1 See, e.g., Agreement on Air Transport Services, U.S.-Belg., supra note 33. Similarly,
Article 14(8) of the Air Transport Agreement between the U.S. and the Russian Federation, Jan.
14, 1994, provides, "Each Party shall, consistent with its national law, give full effect to any
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fails to give full effect to any such decision or award, some liberal bilaterals
provide that the other nation "may take such proportionate steps as may be
appropriate."
4 1
The ICAO noted that arbitration is "a process so costly and time-consuming
that its use in air transport regulation has been extremely rare. '42 To facilitate
it, the ICAO has created a model clause on dispute resolution for insertion into
bilateral air transport agreements.43 Under it, any dispute that cannot be
resolved by consultation may be submitted to a mediator or dispute settlement
panel appointed from a roster of aviation experts maintained by the ICAO.
Mediation should be completed within sixty days of engagement, and costs are
to be apportioned equally. The parties are to participate in good faith, and to
be bound by any decision rendered."
The relatively few instances in which arbitral tribunals have been
commissioned, and the decisions rendered by them, will be explored below.
Before doing so it is important to stand aside for a moment and recognize that,
although arbitrations arising under bilaterals are de jure disputes between
governments, they are de facto disputes between airlines, or between an airline
and a foreign airport or governmental institution.45
B. United States v. France (1963)
While many bilaterals contain clauses for compulsory arbitration of
disputes upon the insistence of either party, none had been invoked prior to
1962. Most international aviation conflicts had instead been resolved between
the governments and/or airlines through consultation or negotiation. Hence,
the 1963 arbitral decision involving a controversy which arose with France
over U.S.-flag rights beyond Paris was a landmark in the history of dispute
resolution.'
decision or award of the arbitral tribunal."
"' See, e.g., Agreement on Air Transport Services, Oct. 1, 1979, art. 15, U.S.-Fiji, 32 U.S.T.
3747, T.I.A.S. No. 9917.
42 ICAO, Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport § 2.3 (ATConfI4-WP5
Appendix, Doc. 9626).
41 ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions, Model Clauses, Recommendation and Declaration
(ATConf/5 March 31, 2003).
" Id. Agenda Item 2.6.
45 The arbitrations described below were de facto disputes between: Pan Am v. Air France
(1963); Pan Am & TWA v. Alitalia (1965); Pan Am v. Air France (1978); Sabena v. Aer Lingus
(1981); Pan Am & TWA v. British Airports Authority (1992); and Qantas v. Northwest Airlines
(1993).
4 "Paul Larsen, Arbitration of the United States-FranceAir Traffic Rights Dispute, 30 J. Am
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The conflict arose over interpretation of the traffic rights conferred by the
U.S.-France Air Transport Services Agreement of 1946."7 Under it, Route One
granted U.S.-flag carriers the opportunity to operate between the United States
to Paris, and thence to Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Egypt, "the Near East,"
India, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, China, and beyond. Route Two allowed
U.S.-flag service from the United States via Spain to Marseille, then via Milan
and Budapest to Turkey and beyond.4 Trans World Airlines (TWA) was
immediately certified to serve Route One; competitive service by Pan
American (Pan Am) from the United States to Paris, thence to Rome and
Beirut, was inaugurated in 1950."9 France argued that Beirut was not included
in the term "Near East," but allowed service to begin nevertheless. In 1955,
Pan Am announced its intention to fly beyond Beirut to Tehran.5°
France again objected on the same grounds, but acquiesced in the new
service.5' However, the French government refused to allow fifth-freedom
movements by Pan Am between Paris and Istanbul, although Pan Am
continued to serve the market without embarking passengers at Paris. Similar
service was begun to Ankara, Turkey, shortly thereafter.
5 2
In 1958, France formally announced its intention to terminate the bilateral.
Notice of renunciation was withdrawn just prior to its effective date, in return
for an expansion of routes for the French-flag carrier, allowing it to serve Los
Angeles and San Francisco.53 In 1960, the United States and France exchanged
L. &COM. 31 (1964).
"' United States-France Air Transport Services Agreement, Mar. 27, 1946, U.S.-Fr. 61 Stat.
3415, T.I.A.S. No. 1679.
41 Id. The U.S.-France bilateral was renegotiated in 1998.
9 Larsen, supra note 46.
o Professor Lowenfeld observed:
Shortly before Pan American proposed service to Istanbul in 1955, it
proposed to extend its Paris-Rome-Beirut service to Tehran, Iran. The Sec-
retary General of Civil and Commercial Aviation told the United States air
attachd that United States carriers did not have the right to serve Tehran via
Paris under the Agreement, (a) because Tehran lay too much to the north to
be included in a reasonably direct route to India; and (b) because Iran was
part of the Middle East and not the Near East. The United States air attachd
replied that those two terms were interchangeable. Several further exchanges
followed between French and American officials and Pan American, but the
service was in fact inaugurated, and maintained (with varying frequencies)
until 1961.
ANDREAS LowENFELD, AVIATION LAw 11-24 (1972).
"' Larsen, supra note 46.
52 Id. at 234.
53 LOWENFELD, supra note 50, art 11-24. The U.S. also received operating rights to serve
both London and Paris on flights from California, but without fifth-freedom rights between the
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notes, giving France access to California via Montreal (but without fifth-free-
dom rights), and providing that "existing service" by Pan Am between Paris
and Istanbul would continue undisturbed.5 4  But, in 1962, the French
government informed Pan Am that all its traffic rights between Paris and
Tehran would be suspended.55
Negotiations between the two governments reached an impasse in 1962,
prompting the United States to invoke the compulsory arbitration clause,
Article X, of the bilateral.56 Two bilateral interpretation questions were
submitted to the ad hoc three-member arbitration panel: (1) whether a U.S.
carrier may provide service between the United States and Turkey via Paris,
and embark and disembark in Paris passengers destined to or originating in
Turkey; and (2) whether a U.S. carrier may provide service between the United
States and Iran via Paris, and embark and disembark in Paris passengers
destined to or originating in Iran.57
The Arbitration Tribunal concluded that neither Turkey nor Iran was
included in Route One of the 1946 bilateral, in the former case because a route
to India via Turkey was specified in Route Two.5" Nevertheless, the Tribunal
attached great weight to French consent in allowing such service to be inau-
gurated and continued for several years. It concluded that a U.S. carrier could
continue to serve Turkey via Paris, not by virtue of the 1946 bilateral, but as
a result of French consent beginning with the inauguration of service in 1955,
European capitals. Id
I Exchange of Notes Between the United States and France, Apr. 5, 1960, U.S.-Fr., T.I.A.S.
No. 5135.
5 LOWENFEW, supra note 50.
Professor Lowenfeld summarized the heart of the controversy:
The amount of money directly involved in the dispute-that is revenue from
Paris-Turkey and Paris-Tehran passengers carried by Pan American-was
estimated at about $400,000 per year. Most of these passengers would,
presumably, go over to Air France if Pan American could not take them. If
Tehran were to be prohibited entirely to planes stopping at Paris (as
contrasted with blind sector rights) the loss to Pan American would be much
greater-perhaps as much as $2,000,000-because its entire route structure
would have to be rearranged. Beyond this, however, both sides saw the
arbitration as a symbolic test. The United States felt that France had been
harassing the American carriers with a view to once more renegotiating the
Agreement; and France felt that the United States, not content with its undue
advantage of 1946, had continued to reach out for more.
Id. at 11-25 (citations omitted).
"' Arbitration Agreement with France, Jan. 22, 1963, U.S.-Fr. art. I, 14 U.S.T. 120, T.I.A.S.
No. 5280. 57 AM. J. INT'LL. 1029-31 (1963).
58 Pan Am-Air France (U.S. v. Fr.), 668 I.L.M. 80-82, decided at Geneva (Dec. 22, 1963).
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and confirmed by the 1960 exchange of notes. However, neither the 1946
agreement nor subsequent practice gave Pan Am the authority to provide fifth-
freedom local service in the corridor. As to Iran, the Tribunal also found that
a U.S. carrier had the right to serve it, not by virtue of the bilateral, but as a
result of informal French consent to the Paris-Rome-Tehran U.S. service
inaugurated in 1955. The United States also had the right to continue fifth-
freedom service in this market, again by virtue of French consent.59 Although
France had the specific legal questions of whether the service violated the
explicit terms of the bilateral resolved in its favor, the United States won both
an economic and equitable victory with the Tribunal's finding that Pan Am
should not be deprived of service begun with French consent, explicit or
implicit, and sustained over a long period of time.6"
C. United States v. Italy (1965)
The second dispute in the history of international aviation to be submitted
to arbitration was one between the United States and Italy involving all-cargo
service to Rome. TWA began passenger service to Italy in 1946 under a
temporary air services agreement;6' the following year it added all-cargo flights
to the market. In 1948, the two governments concluded a bilateral62 on the
Bermuda I model, which became the focus of the controversy. Under the
agreement Pan Am was given authority to enter the market in 1950.63 TWA's
all-cargo service to Italy was interrupted that year by the war in Korea and did
not resume until 1958; once-a-week service was increased to four weekly
TWA all-cargo flights in 1959. Pan Am initiated all-cargo service to Italy in
1960 and increased its service to two flights per week in 1963. Alitalia began
all-cargo service in the market in 1961, and increased its service to three flights
a week in 1963.6
"' Larsen, supra note 46.
60 Id. at 232; A Review of U.S. InternationalAviation Policy, Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Investigations & Oversight of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 438 (1982) (testimony of Donald C. Comlish) [hereinafter Comlish Testimony].
6' See North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319 (1945).
' Air Transport Agreement with Italy, Feb. 6, 1948, 62 Stat. 3729, U.S.-Italy [hereinafter
1948 U.S.-Italy Bilateral].
' See North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 11 C.A.B. 676 (1950).
64 Paul B. Larsen, The United States-Italy Air Transport Arbitration: Problems of Treaty
Interpretation and Enforcement, 61 AM. J INT'L L. 496, 499 (1967) (hereinafter U.S.-Italy
Arbitration]. But see Stanley D. Metzger, 61 AM J. INT'L L. 1007 (1967) (criticizing Larsen's
articles).
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In 1963, both Pan Am's proposal to expand its all-cargo service to four
weekly flights and TWA's proposal to expand to six weekly flights were
rejected by the Italian government.65 Alitalia was in no position to meet the
enhanced competition because of an equipment shortage. The United States
formally objected to the action of the Italian government with a diplomatic
note on September 19, 1963. The crisis came to a head in December of that
year, when TWA announced its intention to substitute jet aircraft in the
market, which would thereby more than double its capacity.6
Consultations between the two governments were held in early 1964, with
Italy taking the position that all-cargo service was not authorized by the 1948
bilateral, which explicitly authorized carriers of the two nations to transport
"passengers, cargo and mail." 7 Italy read this phrase in the conjunctive, as a
requirement for combined passenger and cargo service.6 It has been suggested
that the delaying tactics of the Italian government were designed to give
Alitalia time in which to acquire jet cargo aircraft.69 When consultations failed
to resolve the dispute, the arbitration clause of the bilateral was invoked by the
United States in June 1964, and a tripartite tribunal was commissioned to
resolve the dispute.70 By a vote of two to one, the tribunal upheld the United
States' position, resting its decision on the interpretation of identical language
of Bermuda I (upon which the 1948 U.S.-Italy Bilateral had been based) and
the practice of the airlines of both nations to provide all-cargo service in the
market without objection until 1963. 7'
The United States was slow to exercise its newly won rights to expand its
all-cargo service in the market for fear that Italy might renounce the 1948 U.S.-
Italy Bilateral. The bilateral included other valuable passenger rights which
neither the United States nor its airlines were eager to jeopardize. However,
the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) authorized a third carrier, Seaboard,
to provide all-cargo service in the market in 1966.72 Upon the inauguration of
Seaboard's service, Italy denounced the 1948 U.S.-Italy Bilateral, beginning
SU.S.-Italy Arbitration, supra note 64, at 500.
66 ld.; Martin Bradley, International Air Cargo Services: The Italy-U.S.A. Air Transport
Agreement Arbitration, 12 McGILL L.J. 312, 314-15 (1966).
6 1948 U.S.-Italy Bilateral, supra note 62, art. III.
i Id. art. XII.
LOWENFELD, supra note 50, at 111-62.
70 See Bradley, supra note 66, at 315.
7' U.S.-Italy Arbitration, supra note 64, at 508-09.
7 Transatlantic Route Renewal Case, C.A.B. Order E-23230 (1966). During this period,
Italy also sought increased operating rights to Los Angeles, and beyond New York to Mexico
City. See LOWENFELD, supra note 50, at 11-82.
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the one-year termination clock.73 The negotiations during the ensuing twelve
months failed to produce an agreement, and accordingly the 1948 U.S.-Italy
Bilateral was terminated on May 30, 1967.
Air transport service between the two nations nevertheless continued, but
with the Italian government maintaining its all-cargo restrictions and
threatening fifth-freedom restrictions.74 After thirty-three rounds of negotia-
tions between the two governments, the two nations concluded a new bilateral
in 1970. Then, the Italian government objected to the landing of the new and
larger Boeing 747 Freighter (B747F), which it argued was not in existence
when the new bilateral was signed.75
D. United States v. France (1978)
Perhaps the most interesting of the arbitrations in which the United States
has been involved concerned a subsequent dispute between the United States
and France over Pan Am's "change of gauge" operations76 between London
and Paris. In 1978, Pan Am proposed service between San Francisco and Paris
via London, flying a Boeing 747 (B747) from San Francisco to London, and
offloading the remaining passengers onto a smaller Boeing 727 (B727) aircraft
for the duration of the London-Paris journey. The French objected, arguing
that such "change of gauge" operations were not permitted under the US-
France bilateral.77 The French government banned the new service, insisting
that the U.S. first enter into negotiations by which the French would be given
a privilege of equal value. However, the United States took the position that
Pan Am's proposed operations were already permitted under the existing
bilateral. Efforts to resolve the conflict by consultations and exchange of
diplomatic notes between the two nations proved unsuccessful.78
Pan Am proceeded to commence the "change of gauge" operations on May
1, 1978. After twice issuing warnings to the carrier, on May 3 the French
gendarmes seized the B727 at Paris Orly Airport, refused to allow the
" U.S.-ltaly Arbitration, supra note 64, at 516.
7' LOWENFELD, supra note 50, at 11-82.
71 See A Review of U.S. International Aviation Policy, Hearings Before the House Comm
on Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong. 438 (1982) (testimony of Donald C. Comlish).
76 "Change of gauge" is a term borrowed from the early railroad industry. It involves
substituting equipment of a different size along a through route, and transferring the passengers
from the larger to the smaller aircraft. See Lori Damrosch, Retaliation orArbitration-or Both?
The 1978 United States-France Aviation Dispute, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 785 (1980).
7 61 Stat. 3445,amendedby I U.S.T. 593; 2 U.S.T. 1037; 10 U.S.T. 1791; 13 U.S.T. 1860;
20 U.S.T. 2684.
7 Damrosch, supra note 76, at 785-86.
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passengers to disembark, and ordered the plane returned to London."9 Pan Am
suspended the service and brought an action in French courts seeking reversal
of the decision."' On May 4, the U.S. government requested expeditious
arbitration of the dispute under Article X of the bilateral.
Absent a satisfactory response on behalf of the French government, the
C.A.B. issued a decision under Part 213 of its Economic Regulations8
suspending Air France's service to Los Angeles via Montreal, effective July
12.82 The U.S. government contended that the government of France had
"taken action which, over the objections of the United States Government, will
impair, limit, terminate and deny operating rights and deny the fair and equal
opportunity of U.S. carriers to exercise the operating rights provided for in the
United States-France Air Transport Services Agreement"8 3 On July 11, the day
before the suspension was to become effective, the United States and France
entered into an Arbitral Compromis providing for an expeditious arbitration of
the dispute and requiring that the CAB's suspension order be vacated. 4
On December 9, 1978, the arbitral tribunal rendered its decision, conclud-
ing that France had wrongfully denied Pan Am's "change of gauge" operations
which were implicitly authorized by the bilateral and that C.A.B.'s threatened
invocation of its Part 213 sanctions was lawful.85 The substantive treaty
" Comlish Testimony, supra note 60, at 438-39.
90 Damrosch, supra note 76, at 786.
"' Although concerns about the unfair competitive practices of foreign air carriers were
voiced in the United States as early as 1961, the first U.S. economic regulatory mechanism
designed to combat foreign anti-competitive practices was promulgated in 1970 as Part 213 of
the U.S. C.A.B.'s Economic Regulations. 14 C.F.R. pt. 213 (1985). Part 213 empowered the
C.A.B., upon finding that the "public interest" so required, to insist that a foreign carrier file its
schedules with the Board. Where the foreign carrier was operating pursuant to an existing
bilateral, the C.A.B. could require the foreign carrier to file its schedules only upon a C.A.B.
determination that the foreign carrier's government had limited, terminated, or denied the
operating rights of a U.S. carrier under the bilateral or had otherwise denied it a fair and equal
opportunity to exercise such rights. Upon such a finding, the C.A.B. could issue an order
(subject to presidential veto) blocking the inauguration or continuation of those operations set
forth in the schedule. The C.A.B. was sunsetted on December 31, 1984, and its responsibilities
were transferred to the U.S. Department ofTransportation [U.S.D.O.T.]. See Paul Dempsey, The
Rise & Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board-Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP.
L.J. 91 (1979).
62 See C.A.B. Order 78-5-106 (1978); C.A.B. Order 87-6-82 (1978); C.A.B. Order 78-6-202
(1978); and Paul Dempsey, The International Rate and Route Revolution in North Atlantic
Passenger Transportation, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 393, 430-40 (1978).
83 C.A.B. Order 78-5-45 (1978).
See C.A.B. Order 78-7-33 (1978); Dempsey, supra note 82, at 440.
Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946, Arbitral Award (United
States v. France), Dec. 9, 1978,54 I.L.R. 304 (1979) [hereinafter 1978 U.S.-France Arbitration].
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interpretation question was whether Pan Am's "change of gauge" in London
to smaller aircraft on its San Francisco-Paris flight violated the United States-
France Bilateral. The tribunal ultimately answered this question in the
negative, and therefore concluded that French authorities had on May 3, 1978,
unlawfully suspended Pan Am's service in that market. 86 France raised major
procedural defenses to the United States' claims.
On May 18, 1978, Pan Am brought an action before the Administrative
Tribunal of Paris seeking a determination that the suspension of its service was
ultra vires. France argued that the Arbitral Tribunal could not properly reach
the issues before it until Pan Am had exhausted the judicial remedies available
in the Paris Administrative Tribunal under French law. 7 The Arbitral Tribunal
held that the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is inapplicable where
the dispute is between two governments over issues of treaty interpretation
involving the conduct of air transport services."s
See generally Damrosch, supra note 76, at 788. This controversy illustrates the effective use of
unilateral sanctions under Part 213 as a means of facilitating expeditious implementation of a
bilateral's arbitration provisions. As one commentator noted:
One result of the U.S. action was that France had substantially more interest
in a speedy resolution of the dispute than before the entry of the first part 213
order. Thus, the threat of retaliation served as a substitute for effective
international judicial mechanisms to enforce a preexisting commitment to
arbitrate.
Damrosch, supra note 76, at 779.
However, the Compromis tended to disfavor the interests of Pan Am, for although it
established a relatively prompt date for conclusion of the arbitration (i.e., December 10), it
allowed Pan Am to continue its change of gauge operations for only one-half of the days since
the dispute commenced on May 1. Since the Compromis was not signed until mid-July, Pan Am
had already lost the opportunity to participate in much of the summer peak season. Hence, total
maintenance of the status quo, from May I to July 14, and partial maintenance of it between July
14 and December 10, inured to the benefit of the French-flag carrier, Air France, and to the
detriment of the U.S.-flag carrier, Pan American. Id. at 801-02; Stanley Rosenfield, Interna-
tional Aviation: United States Government-Industry Partnership, 16 INT'L L. 473, 488, 495
(1982).
86 1978 U.S.-France Arbitration, supra note 85, at 305-06.
87 Id. at 309. For an argument in favor of the increased use of domestic courts for the
resolution of international disputes, see RICHARD FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE wrrH
INTERNATIONAL LAW 212-35 (Robert Kogod ed., 1981).
88 See 1978 U.S.-France Arbitration, supra note 85, at 324-25 (holding
the application of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies has always been
taken into consideration only in connection with a discussion of the question
of the international responsibility of a State for an unlawful act... committed
on its territory against a national of another State and for refusal to grant
reparation for this unlawful act, viz, a denial of justice.
(quoting Swiss Confederation v. Federal Republic of Germany (No. 1), 25 I.L.R. 33,42 (1958))).
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France also objected to the C.A.B. Orders of May 9 and May 31, 1978,
issued under Part 213 to the Board's Economic Regulations.89 The May 9
order required Air France and U.T.A. to file their existing and new schedules
with the Civil Aeronautics Board. The C.A.B. threatened to curtail Air
France's thrice weekly service between Paris and Los Angeles; the order was
suspended as soon as an Arbitral Compromis had been signed between the two
governments .9 France contended that these unilateral actions were improperly
designed to coerce it to submit to binding arbitration and to agree to the
expedited procedures and interim arrangements (including a partial resumption
of Pan Am's operations) provided for in the Compromis.9'
A prior international wrong, exhaustion of alternative remedies, and
necessity and proportionality have been advanced as the requirements imposed
by customary international law upon retaliation.92 France took the position that
the C.A.B.'s Orders were unjustified under the law of reprisals and under the
rule of proportionality.93 It contended that reprisals may only be initiated in
the case of necessity, where other legal alternatives for resolution of the
dispute do not exist. Clearly, the alternative of arbitration still existed under
Article X of the 1946 bilateral; the United States had not exhausted its
noncoercive remedies. France also alleged that the measures taken by the
United States were disproportionate to the harm suffered in that the deprivation
of Air France's three weekly flights to Los Angeles (which were clearly
authorized under the bilateral) caused it to suffer an economic prejudice far
exceeding that endured by Pan Am (services which at least arguably fell
For a review of the opportunities domestic tribunals offer for adjudication of international legal
disputes, see generally FISHER, supra note 87, at 212-35.
9 C.A.B. Order 78-6-82 (1978); C.A.B. Order 78-6-292 (1978).
90 1978 U.S.-France Arbitration, supra note 85.
9' Id.; Damrosch, supra note 76, at 803.
' Derek Bowett has proffered an interesting model for assessing the lawfulness of economic
reprisals, which includes three succinct requirements:
1. A prior international delinquency against the claimant State. (This would
exclude reprisals against economic measures not in themselves unlawful.)
2. Redress by other means must be either exhausted or unavailable.
3. The economic measures must be limited to the necessities of the case and
proportionate to the wrong done.
Derek Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1972)
(citations omitted); Paul Dempsey, Economic Coercion and Self-Defense in International Law:
The Arab Oil Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL.
253,261-62 (1977).
" 1978 U.S.-France Arbitration, supra note 85.
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outside the scope of the bilateral since the Pan Am aircraft landing in Paris had
not originated in the United States).'
Must a nation explore all political and legal alternatives for dispute res-
olution before it may institute unilateral coercive measures to compel com-
pliance with international legal obligations?95 The Tribunal noted the general
obligation for negotiation established by Article 33 of the UN Charter, as well
as Article VIII of the United States-France Bilateral, which imposes analogous
obligations of consultations to resolve aviation disputes arising thereunder."
But it could find no customary rule of international law which prohibits
countermeasures' from being employed until the available arbitral orjudicial
machinery has been instituted.9" However, once the arbitral or adjudicatory
tribunal is commissioned to resolve the controversy, the parties' rights to
employ coercive measures are reduced to the extent that the tribunal has the
means necessary to achieve the interim result sought by their employment. 99
Indeed, it would seem that U.S. threats of retaliatory sanctions were
instrumental in upsetting the status quo sufficiently as to diminish France's su-
perior position and give it a strong incentive to engage expeditiously in the
third-party arbitration mechanism mandated by Article X of the bilateral."°
94 Id.
" While establishing no general rule prohibiting the use of coercive means during
negotiations, the Tribunal offered these words of caution:
It goes without saying that recourse to countermeasures involves a great risk
of giving rise, in turn, to further reaction, thereby causing an escalation which
will lead to a worsening of the conflict.... They should be used with a spirit
of great moderation and accompanied by a genuine effort at resolving the
dispute. But the Arbitral Tribunal does not believe that it is possible, in the
present state of international relations, to lay down a rule prohibiting the use
of countermeasures during negotiations, especially where such countermea-
sures are accompanied by an offer for a procedure affording the possibility of
accelerating the solution of the dispute.
Id. at 339-40.
96 Ia at 339.
97 See EiSABETh ZOUER, PEACETIME UNiLATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
COUNTRMEASURES 45 (1984).
98 d at 340; Damrosch, supra note 76, at 796-97.
" 1978 U.S.-France Arbitration, supra note 85, at 340-41. Conversely, where the tribunal
lacks adequate ability to resolve interim measures to protect the aggrieved party, it may not lose
its unilateral right to engage in coercive conduct. Id. at 341.
"' As one commentator has aptly noted, "the threat of retaliation served as a substitute for
effective international judicial mechanisms to enforce a preexisting commitment to arbitrate."
Damrosch, supra note 76, at 799. She also provided an excellent explanation of the occasional
need to upset the status quo:
If only one party has been injured, the expectation of possible gain from
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Hence, the threat or employment of coercive means may sometimes be used in
eliminating the incentive for delay and encouraging a prompt resolution the
dispute.
The Tribunal also addressed what it described as the well known rule
requiring proportionality of countermeasures:'' "that all counter-measures
must, in the first instance, have some degree of equivalence with the alleged
breach."'" France had argued that the U.S. denial of Air France's thrice-
weekly service from Los Angeles far exceeded the injury suffered by Pan Am
as a result of the French government's refusal to allow its change of gauge at
London.03  But in the Tribunal's view, a strict economic comparison of
economic injury suffered by the two carriers was only part of an appropriate
assessment of proportionality.'" An evaluation also had to be made of the
importance of the questions of principle arising from the alleged breach. 5
Taking into account the broader policy ramifications of the French interpreta-
tion of its bilateral as prohibiting change of gauge upon U.S. air transport
relations with other nations with which it has concluded similar bilaterals, the
Tribunal concluded that the coercive means employed by the United States
were not disproportionate to the French actions to which they responded."°
Hence, the immediate economic injury suffered must be evaluated in the
context of this broader policy controversy in order to appraise whether the
countermeasures are proportionate to the harm suffered, although this
arbitration is likely to be asymmetrical in the early stages of a treaty dispute.
One party believes itself the victim of unlawful action; the other party enjoys
the status quo and has little incentive to participate in facilitating an
arbitration that might change that status quo. The aggrieved party can suggest
that adjudication will help keep relations amicable; or it can point to a
preexisting arbitration treaty or arbitration clause in the treaty in dispute; or,
where appropriate, it can invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the (ICJ]. But
since it is of course rare to find a tribunal already in place at the inception of
the dispute with jurisdiction to change the status quo by entering and
enforcing interim protective orders, the claimant state will almost always be
at a severe disadvantage.
Id. at 798.
10 The Arbitral Tribunal used the term "counter-measures" repeatedly. See also ZOuER,
supra note 97, at 137.
1 1978 U.S.-France Arbitration, supra note 85, at 338.
103 Id. at 319.
104 Id. at 338.
105 Id.
106 id.
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weighing and balancing of competing interests can only be performed in
general approximations. 7
The Arbitral Tribunal's decision in the 1978 United States v. France
dispute was silent as to the international law requirement of a prior interna-
tional delinquency against the claimant state. However, its acceptance as a
principle of customary international law appears to be largely unquestioned
(although commentators disagree as to whether the breach of a treaty
obligation need be "material," and as to whether the responding state must
have a "good faith" belief in the existence of a prior legal wrong). The
criterion of exhaustion of noncoercive methods of dispute resolution does not
mean that the domestic courts of the offending government must first be given
an opportunity to provide a remedy. Nor does this mean that economic
reprisals must be withheld until an arbitral or adjudicatory tribunal is
commissioned to hear the case. Also, the requirement of proportionality in
responding to coercion is not limited merely to an assessment of the compara-
tive economic injury endured by the two parties, but also embraces the
political importance which the governments attach to the legal questions at
issue."
One commentator has pointed out that the real conflict between the two
governments was not the legal issue of whether change of gauge rights beyond
London to Paris were conferred by the bilateral. According to Professor
Richard Bilder, France's denial of Pan Am's efforts was predicated upon its
desire to force the United States to give it over-the-pole operating rights to the
west coast of the United States. 09 The United States' decision to submit the
legal issue to arbitration, employing the C.A.B.'s Part 213 as a coercive
catalyst to get the French to the negotiating table, irritated the French and
"o Id. One source has summarized the Tribunal's liberal definition of the principle of
proportionality:
First, it permits states to apply countermeasures that would be disproportion-
ate in an economic sense, in order to enforce a principle. Second, it implies
that considerations of principle are all the more weighty when third countries
are watching. Figuring third-country reactions into the proportionality
formula is novel but sensible, especially in the aviation context. Because of
the worldwide network of essentially similar agreements, the way two states
interpret and apply their bilateral agreement can have repercussions far
beyond the particular case.
Damrosch, supra note 85, at 792.
0 Bowett, supra note 92, at 5.
'o' Richard Bilder, Some Limitations on Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement
Technique, 23 VA. J. LNT'l L. 1, 6 (1982).
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frustrated their real objective."' Professor Bilder has noted this example as
reflecting one of the disadvantages of third-party dispute resolution: "A
tribunal must necessarily focus narrowly on the immediate 'legal' issue before
it, which may have little to do with the true source of contention between the
parties."" In several bilaterals concluded since the early 1990s, the U.S. has
inserted clauses specifically authorizing change of gauge operations. This
should reduce the likelihood of future disputes on the subject.
E. Belgium v. Ireland (1981)
To date, the only international aviation dispute brought to arbitration not
involving the United States was between Belgium and Ireland over the
interpretation of the capacity clause in their bilateral. The original Bermuda
I model capacity clause had precluded any explicit predetermination of ca-
pacity, and instead limited it to the general provision that "air services are to
provide capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of which
such airline is a national and the country of ultimate destination of traffic.""' 2
The Belgium-Ireland Bilateral provided that the capacity offered over the route
in question "shall be adapted to traffic needs" and take into account the mutual
interests of the airlines serving the routes so that their operations are not
"unduly affected."'"1 3
I10 Id.
11 Id. at 4.
112 Jacques Naveau, Away From Bermuda?, 8 AIR L. 44, 44-45 (1983). Bermuda I-type
agreements left to the discretion of carriers the levels of capacity offered, although there were
vague provisions requiring that: (a) air services should be closely related to traffic demand; (b)
there should be a fair and equal opportunity for the air carriers of the two nations to operate over
the designated routes; and (c) the "interest of the air carriers of the other government shall be
taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides on all
or part of the same route." Moreover, each nation enjoyed the right of ex post facto review of
capacity. Id.; United States Standard Form of Bilateral Air Transport Agreement, arts. 8-10
(1953). See Bilateral Agreements, supra note 19, at 241, 250. The capacity language of
Bermuda 1-type bilaterals has been described as "deliberately vague." Gertler, supra note 29,
at 803. The ex post facto review provisions thereof have been rarely used. Id. at 803-04.
113 Article VIII of the 1955 Belgium-Ireland bilateral provided:
(1) The transport capacity provided by the contracting parties' airlines on
the agreed services shall be adapted to traffic needs.
(2) On joint routes, the airlines designated by the contracting parties shall
take into account their mutual interests so that their respective air
services shall not be unduly affected.
Naveau, supra note 112, at 46-47.
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Belgium argued that excessive capacity existed in the market, that capacity
was imbalanced in favor of Aer Lingus (the Irish-flag carrier), and that the ten
weekly flights of the two nations should be reduced to eight, to be divided
equally between the carriers of both nations, Aer Lingus and Sabena (the
Belgian-flag carrier). The average load factors in the market during the
preceding two years had ranged between thirty-six percent and forty-three
percent."' Ireland responded that the market had no overcapacity considering
such factors as revenues, costs, and expanding traffic, and that there existed no
universal rule on the subject of capacity divisions under bilaterals. Further,
Ireland maintained that equalizing capacity share would fail to take into
account Aer Lingus' role in developing the market or prior capacity agree-
ments concluded between the two governments.' 5
For the sake of expediting resolution of the controversy, a single arbitrator
was elected under Article X of the bilateral, Henrik Winberg, who had
formerly served as Sweden's Director of General Civil Aviation, and ECAC's
u4 Belgium maintained:
a) that excess capacity had been created;
b) that there was an imbalance in traffic carried;
c) that these two problems, contrary to the agreement, created a third problem,
for they unduly affected the services of the carrier designated by Belgium;
d) that these discrepancies should be corrected by reducing the total number
of services to 8, to be shared equally by the two designated airlines: 4 for
Sabena and 4 for Aer Lingus;
e) that such an equal distribution was stipulated by the agreement, and that
equality was also set as an objective by the designated airlines.
Id. at48.
'" Ireland maintained:
a) that there was no overcapacity in this case, i.e., taking the route char-
acteristics into account-level of revenues, costs, and expanding traffic-as
aviation agreements could not set a universal rule in this respect;
b) that, on the contrary, prospects for traffic growth were favourable,
particularly because the market had been insufficiently developed so far (in
terms of tourism);
c) that there were grounds for maintaining adequate frequency to ensure
market development;
d) that a reduction in frequency would be contrary to the public interest
(particularly with the requirements for schedules associated with traffic to and
from Brussels, the EEC headquarters);
e) that an equal share in capacity would not take into account the effort made
by Aer Lingus, which alone had created and developed the route over the
years, or the capacity adjustments already accepted since the advent of Sabena
on the market in 1979.
Id. at 48-49.
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president."16 As a matter of general principle, Mr. Winberg found the existence
of excess capacity inimical to the development of a sound aviation industry. "7
But Winberg also assessed the historic contribution of Aer Lingus to the
market, pointing out that the carrier determined capacity exclusively prior to
1979, reducing its service as Sabena entered the market, and that sixty percent
of the traffic originated in Ireland. Nevertheless, passenger load factors had
been but forty percent during the prior two years-"a very low figure
compared with other European routes operated by the designated airlines and
other European airlines.""' 8 Mr. Winberg concluded "that overcapacity has
existed on the Brussels-Dublin route for two years, that future growth is not
likely to remedy this situation and that a reduction of capacity is needed as
early as possible.""' 9 He therefore ordered that the existing ten roundtrips in
the Sunday evening-Friday evening time period be reduced in number. But he
did not feel that there should be an equal division of frequencies, suggesting
that Sabena reduce its four roundtrips by one, and that Aer Lingus yield two
of its six roundtrips.') These reductions would, he thought, produce an
average load factor of fifty percent in the market,' and thereby increase the
profitability of both carriers' operations.
116 Id. at 47-48.
1"7 Specifically, he found:
-Air transport is a collective transport rmode, which is necessarily limited to
certain days and times for the operation of services.
-Any excess capacity is prohibited by the need to avoid operations that do
not comply with sound airline service economics.
-The airlines should take their mutual interests into account so that their
respective services are not unduly impaired. In particular, this means that an
airline may not provide excessive capacity likely to endanger the viability of
the other carrier's operations on a given route or to limit, on that route, its
role of operating the various categories of traffic on the most profitable basis.
Jacques Naveau, A New Arbitration Verdict Involving a Bilateral Agreement: Arbitration On
the Belgium/Ireland Capacity Clause, 38 I.T.A. WKLY. BuL. 975 (1981) [hereinafter New
Arbitration Verdict].
"'a Naveau, supra note 112, at 54.
"I Id. at 55.
120 Id. at 56.
2I See id. at 50, 57. Jacques Naveau, A New Arbitration Verdict Involving a Bilateral
Agreement: Arbitration On the Belgium/Ireland Capacity Clause, 38 I.T.A. WKLY. BUI. 980-81
(1981).
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F. United States v. United Kingdom (1992)
Among the general objectives established by the Chicago Convention is the
obligation of ICAO to "develop the principles and techniques of air navigation
and to foster the planning and development of international air transport so as
to" inter alia, "[a]void discrimination between contracting States." ' In
addition to this broad policy directive to assist in achieving an international
aviation environment free of discrimination are the specific provisions of
Article 15 of the Chicago Convention, which require ICAO's members to give
foreign carriers nondiscriminatory treatment in the use of their airports and air
navigation facilities, and to assess airport and user fees at a level no higher
than those charged local aircraft in the performance of like or similar
services. 121
The United States-United Kingdom passenger market is the largest in the
transatlantic sphere. Sir Winston Churchill described these two nations as
separated by a common language. Indeed, they have held vigorous debates
over the policy differences between them in the field of aviation.
A long-standing dispute between the two governments has focused on
allegations of discriminatory and excessive landing fees and user charges at
British airports. One aspect of these which caused irritation was a distance-
based formula whereby landing fees increased with the distance flown, thereby
falling most heavily upon transatlantic carriers. Because the fees were not
related to the costs of providing such services, the United States in 1975 found
under its Fair Competitive Practices Act (FCPA)24 that they were excessive
and discriminatory. As a consequence, the distance-based formula was
eliminated for most British airports immediately, although they were retained
at Scottish airports until late 1979.125 However, other aspects of these charges
continued to cloud Anglo-American aviation relations.
In 1977, the British Airports Authority (BAA)126 revised its fee schedule to
impose a steep increase in peak-period charges. As a portion of the peak
122 Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 44(g). See Edwin Bailey, Article 15 of the
Chicago Convention and the Duty of States to Avoid Discriminatory User Charges: The US-UK
London Heathrow Airport User Charges Arbitration, 19 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 81 (1994).
" Bailey, supra note 122. See Rod Margo & William MacCary, The Chicago Convention
and the Resolution of Landing Fee Disputes, 19 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 501 (1994).
12 International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. §
1159(b) (West Supp. 1989).
' C.A.B. Report to Congress 102 (1979).
12 At this writing, BAA owns seven airports in the U.K., including Heathrow, and operates
ten foreign airports. See BAA, Corporate: About BAA, http://www.baa.com/main/corporate/
about-baa-frame.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
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factor, BAA added a weight element.'27 These weight-based runway charges
allegedly discriminated against the wide-bodied aircraft used by transatlantic
carriers:
For example, the British Airways Trident requires more runway
strength than the B-747, and the British Airways Concorde
greater runway length than the B-747, but each Trident landing
costs only about one-ninth that of a B-747, and each Concorde
landing costs a fraction of the B-747 cost. Parking charges, also
weight-based, are disproportionately high for B-747 aircraft
relative to spatial requirements. 2 '
After the peak period rates were announced, U.S. carriers asked their
government to take retaliatory action under the FCPA. The U.S. government
declined to take such action, but continued to negotiate with the British on the
issue, repeatedly requesting access to more cost data. However, a provision
prohibiting excessive or discriminatory user charges was incorporated as a part
of the newly negotiated bilateral, the U.S.-U.K. Air Services Agreement of
1977 (Bermuda I1).29
U.S. air carriers are authorized to serve London's Heathrow Airport and
other U.K. destinations pursuant to Bermuda H. 3 Prior to 1991, the two U.S.
flag carriers designated by the United States under Bermuda II to serve
Heathrow were Pan Am and TWA. In 1991, Pan Am and TWA sold their
Heathrow operating authorities to United Airlines and American Airlines,
respectively.'
To prohibit unfair, arbitrary, and discriminatory fees, many bilaterals,
including Bermuda II, require that airport fees, rates, and charges be just,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Given the difficulty that Pan Am and TWA
were having at Heathrow, Bermuda H's airport pricing provisions, negotiated
in 1977, were more detailed than most. Not only must such fees be reasonable
127 C.A.B. Report to Congress 115-16 (1977).
' A Review of U.S. International Aviation Policy, Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 52 (1982) (statement of C.E.
Meyer, Jr.).
129 C.A.B. Report to Congress 115-116 (1977). See generally Dempsey, supra note 82.
13 Agreement Concerning Air Services, July 23, 1977, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 5367, as
amended Apr. 25, 1978,29 U.S.T. 2680, Dec. 27, 1979,32 U.S.T. 524, Dec. 4, 1980,33 U.S.T.
655, Feb. 20, 1985, May 25, 1989, and Mar. 11, 1994.
131 Samuel Witten, The U.S.-U.K. Arbitration Concerning HeathrowAirport User Charges,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 174 (1995); PAUL DEMPSEY & LAURENCE GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT:
STRATEGIES FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 10-18 (1997).
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and nondiscriminatory, but the governments also were obliged to use their
"best efforts" to ensure that charges were equitably apportioned among
categories of users, were based on sound economic principles, and resulted in
no more than a reasonable return on investment, after depreciation. Article
10(2) provided: "Neither Contracting Party shall impose or permit to be
imposed on the designated airlines of the other Contracting Party user charges
higher than those imposed on its own designated airlines operating similar
international air services."' 3' Article 10(3) provided:
User charges may reflect, but shall not exceed, the full cost to the
competent charging authorities of providing appropriate airport
and air navigation facilities and services, and may provide for a
reasonable rate of return on assets, after depreciation. In the
provision of facilities and services, the competent authorities
shall have regard to such factors as efficiency, economic,
environmental impact and safety of operation. User charges shall
be based on sound economic principles and on the generally
accepted accounting principles within the territory of the
appropriate Contracting Party.'33
Article 10(5) required each government to use its "best efforts" to encourage
the competent airport authorities and airlines "to exchange such information
as may be necessary to permit an accurate review of the reasonableness of the
charges in accordance with the principles set out in this Article.""M In
Bermuda II, the parties also reaffirmed their adherence to the Chicago
Convention, and noted that the obligations agreed to in the bilateral were
complementary to those in the Chicago Convention. Thus, Bermuda 11's
Article 10 amplifies the requirements of Chicago's Article 15.' 3
'32 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1994, art. 10(2), 61 Stat. 1180.
Accord, id. art. 15, which reads::
Any charges that may be imposed or permitted to be imposed by a contracting
State for the use of such airports and air navigation facilities by the aircraft of
any other contracting State shall not be higher, (b) As to aircraft engaged in
scheduled international air services, than those that would be paid by its
national aircraft engaged in similar international air services.
m Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Norther Ireland (July 23, 1977), CCH Avi. I
26,540c.
'14 Id. art. 10(b).
.. Bailey, supra note 122, at 88-89.
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Article 16 provided that "[e]ither Contracting Party may at any time
request consultations on the implementation, interpretation, application or
amendment of this Agreement or compliance with this Agreement." Under
Article 17, disputes not settled by consultation may be resolved by binding
arbitration. 136
After failing to secure adequate cost data from the British government, the
United States hired an independent consultant to assess the user charges. In
a report concluded in the spring of 1979, the consultant found that charges at
Heathrow seemed to exceed any identifiable costs. The study was tendered to
the BAA for comment, but no response was forthcoming. Further discussions
between the two governments led the United Kingdom to eliminate some of the
discriminatory elements of the fees in late 1979, including the distance rule
formula for Scottish airports. 13
7
U.S. officials continued to seek reliable cost data. The U.S. government
called for formal consultations with the U.K. in 1981.138 In 1982, the BAA
was persuaded to postpone an increase in charges.139  Frustration with
governmental inertia led many carriers to file suit in British courts seeking a
reduction of allegedly excessive landing fees."4 Pan Am instituted an action
against the BAA in the U.K. High Court seeking to recover $10.5 million in
"excessive and illegal" fees which had been collected between April 1 and
August 31, 1980.14' TWA and eighteen foreign airlines 42 formed a British
Airports User Action Group and brought a parallel action in the High Court
against John Nott (the Secretary of State for Trade) and BAA. 4 3 These
136 Witten, supra note 131, at 176-77.
"' C.A.B. Report to Congress 102 (1979).
138 A Review of U.S. International Aviation Policy, Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 591 (1982) (statement of
Robert D. Hormats).
131 C.A.B. Report to Congress 82 (1932); A Review of U.S. International Aviation Policy,
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st and
2nd Sess. 1217-18 (1982) (testimony of Robert D. Hormats).
14 A Review of U.S. International Aviation Policy, Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 35 (1982) (statement of C.E.
Meyer. Jr.).
141 J. PLAIGNAUD, ITA STUDY ON AERONAUTICAL CHARGES 31 (1981). Pan Am challenged
the Airport Authority Act of 1955, which allowed BAA to impose fees that covered costs plus
a six percent return on capital assets. Id.
142 The plaintiff carriers were Air Canada, Air France, Air Mauritius, Alitalia, Austrian,
BWIA International, Lufthansa, Flying Tiger, Gulf Air, Iberia, KLM, Sabena, Saudi Arabia,
Scandinavian Airlines System, Swissair, TWA, and Trans Mediterranean Airways. Id.
143 Id.
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conflicts appeared, falsely, to have been resolved." The U.K. government
lowered Heathrow fees when the U.S. Department of Transportation
threatened to triple fees for British carriers at New York's John F. Kennedy
Airport. 1 4
5
Although some changes were made pursuant to a 1983 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between the two governments, the system remained a
focus of intergovernmental dispute, culminating in a U.S. demand for
arbitration in 1988." In requesting arbitration, the U.S. government alleged
that the U.K. government had not adequately supervised the operator of
Heathrow Airport, permitting BAA to impose charges on U.S. airlines that
were excessive and discriminatory. 47 A three-member arbitration panel was
established in January 1989. It held hearings at The Hague from July 2 to
August 2, 1991, and issued a 369-page decision on November 20, 1992.4 s
The arbitration panel ruled that the U.K. had failed to use its best efforts to
ensure that landing fees charged at Heathrow between 1983 and 1989 were fair
and reasonable.'49 The panel assessed the legal status of the 1983 MOU
entered into by the U.K. and U.S. governments in order to resolve problems
'"C.A.B. Report to Congress 73 (1983).
'4 Matt Scocozza, Speech before the 45th Annual Meeting of Delta Nu Alpha Transportation
Fraternity, Inc., at San Antonio, Texas (Oct. 3, 1985) [hereinafter Scocozza Speech].
'46 On Dec. 16, 1988, the U.S. initiated the arbitration with a note from the Department of
State to the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International Law: Organization of American States, 88 AM.
J. INT'L L. 719, 738 (1994). A year earlier, this author had suggested that such a complaint
might be filed at ICAO:
[E]ven assuming that the ICAO Council is a body which can render only a
political decision reflecting the position of member governments, there may
be instances when the complaining party believes that it would win where, for
example, landing fees at a popular international airport are exorbitant and
discriminate against foreign carriers. The offended governments might be in-
clined to direct their Council representatives to vote that the fees violate
Article 15 and the Council's 1981 Policies on Charges for Airports and Route
Air Navigation Facilities. The potential sanctions under Articles 87 and 88
are among the most severe available to any multilateral organization. Their
threat would likely compel the losing party to comply with the Council's
determination expeditiously.
DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 302.
" U.S., U.K. Resolve Airport Fee Dispute, D.O.T. Says; U.K. Agrees to Pay $29.5 Million
Settlement, PR NEwswiRE, Mar. 11, 1994.
148 Witten, supra note 131, at 184; Bailey, supra note 122.
" Carole A. Shifrin, Commons Panel Offers Bilateral Compromise, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 21, 1994, at 33.
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regarding the interpretation and application of Bermuda 11. " The U.K. argued
that the MOU on airport user charges was not a legally binding international
agreement.' The Arbitration Panel concluded that the MOU was "a
potentially important aid to interpretation but is not a source of independent
legal rights and duties capable of enforcement in the present Arbitration."12
On March 11, 1994, the United States and U.K. exchanged diplomatic notes
settling the Heathrow arbitration. The U.K. government paid the U.S.
government $29.5 million in settlement of the dispute." 3 It also agreed to
phase out the international peak pricing at Heathrow in four installments over
a period from April 1, 1995-1998, and assured that no such fee would be
imposed again before April 1, 2003. 5 The settlement was reached after five
months of intensive negotiations, following five years of litigation over
Heathrow's landing fees, which itself followed five years of failed attempts to
resolve the problem through negotiations. The British government also agreed
to drop its claim that some U.S. airports overcharged U.K. carriers.'
Language in the Arbitration Panel's ruling had concerned U.S. airport
operators because it suggested that a compensatory ratemaking scheme might
violate the bilateral.15s
G. Australia v. United States (1993)
Under the U.S.-Australia bilateral,"s7 the United States may designate a
carrier to serve the North Pacific route from the United States to any two
points in Australia (chosen from Brisbane, Cairns, Melbourne and Sydney) via
Canada, Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines. For many decades, neither
nation had equipment to fly the route. In June 1991, Northwest Airlines was
io Ian Sinclair, Book Review and Note: The Concept of Treaty in International Law, 91 AM.
J. INT'LL. 748 (1997).
"I James McNeill, International Agreements: Recent U.S.-U.K. Practice Concerning the
Memorandum of Understanding, 88 AM. 1. INT'LL. 821 (1994).
152 Nash (Leich), supra note 146, at 742-43.
153 Conrad K. Harper, Friedmann Award Address, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 266
(1997).
' Nash (Leich), supra note 146, at 740.
5 U.K. to Pay U.S. $29.5 Million in Heathrow Fee Dispute, AvWATION DAILY, Mar. 17,
1994, at 5.
156 U.S. and U.K. Settle Heathrow Charges; U.K. Drops Claim Against U.S. Airports,
AIRPORTS, Mar. 15, 1994, at 100.
'"" Air Transport Agreement Between the United States and Australia, Dec. 3, 1946, U.S.-
Aust., 61 Stat. 2464 [hereinafter U.S.-Australia Bilateral].
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designated to serve the New York-Osaka-Sydney route,' and began providing
service over it on October 27, 1991. Soon, between 80-85% of Northwest's
traffic on the route was local Japanese-Australian passengers, with no link to
the United States, and therefore arguably violative of the "primary objective"
provision of the capacity provision in Annex B, Section IV of the bilateral. 59
The "primary objective" clause requires that the traffic on the fifth-freedom
route in question should be primarily based on traffic going to or coming from
an airline's country of registry."° Given the enormous circuity of routing New
York passengers bound to Sydney through the out-of-the-way locale of Osaka,
adding more than ten hours to the journey, it is no wonder that few Americans
or Australians were interested in Northwest's offering, and that the traffic on
the route was primarily Japanese headed to Australia, or Australians headed
to Japan-seventh-freedom 6' traffic not authorized under the bilateral. But
Is D.O.T. Order 91-6-26 (1991).
"5 Section IV(4) of the U.S.-Australia Bilateral provides, "the total air transportation services
offered [by the airlines] over the routes specified in this Annex shall bear a close relationship to
the requirements of the public for such services." Section IV provides,
That the services provided by [the airlines over these routes] shall retain as
their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic
demands between the country which designates such airline and the country
of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on
such services international traffic destined for and coming from third
countries... shall be applied in accordance with the general principles of
orderly development to which both Governments subscribe and shall be
subject to the general principle that capacity should be related:
(a) to the traffic requirements between the country of origin and the
countries of destination;
(b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and
(c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes
after taking account of local and regional services.
U.S.-Australia Bilateral, supra note 157, annex B, § IV.
"o Bilaterals modeled on Bermuda I, such as the U.S.-Australia Bilateral, provide that the
"primary objective" of the provision of capacity is to meet traffic demands between the country
of nationality of the air carrier and the country of destination of the traffic, with fifth-freedom
traffic capacity bearing a relationship to the carrier's combined third- and fourth-freedom traffic
on the route in question. Air Services Agreement with the United Kingdom, Feb. 11, 1946,
U.S.-U.K. 60 Stat. 1499. Specifically, Annex B(ii) of the U.S.-Australia Bilateral, which
addressed North Pacific route capacity, provided "the primary purposes of such service is the
carriage of traffic originating in or destined for the designated airline's territory." U.S.-Australia
Bilateral, supra note 157, annex B, §ii.
'" "Seventh-freedom" allows an airline operating totally outside its territory of registry to
pick up passengers or cargo in another country, and take it to a third country. DEMPSEY, supra
note 3, at 50.
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the bilateral also called for ex post facto review of capacity, and not unilateral
freezing of it. 162
On December 1, 1992, the Australian government notified Northwest
Airlines that two of its three weekly Osaka-Sydney flights would be limited to
no more than fifty percent fifth-freedom traffic, and the third would have none,
conditions that would make the route economically infeasible. On January 22,
1993, Northwest Airlines filed an FCPA complaint before the U.S. D.O.T.,
asking it to suspend Qantas' service between Los Angeles and Sydney, and
filed suit in an Australian court challenging the legality of the restrictions. 163
"6 In Bermuda 1, the United States and the U.K. agreed that the designated carriers of each
nation would be free to institute at their discretion capacity and designated fifth-freedom traffic
arrangements, subject to the general principle that the primary objective of each nation's carriers
should be the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of which
such air carrier is a national and the country of ultimate destination of the traffic. Should one
nation have reason to believe that a carrier of the other had instituted capacity or fifth-freedom
arrangements in excess of the relevant traffic demands, that nation could request an ex post facto
review by both governments of the carrier's actions.
Under Bermuda 1, in the event that either nation becomes dissatisfied with capacity offered
by carriers on a particular route, Article 9 of the Final Act provides for a system of regular and
frequent consultations between governmental authorities of the two nations. In conjunction with
the consultation, dispute, and renunciation provisions set forth in articles 8, 9, and 10 of the
Agreement, Article 9 of the Final Act establishes the so-called ex post facto review procedure
of capacity, which is considered by many commentators to be one of the essential elements of
Bermuda L PRICING AND CAPACITY, supra note 12, at 33. If either nation invoked the ex post
facto review mechanism, governmental authorities of both nations might enter negotiations or,
if necessary, submit the dispute to arbitration.
The original Bermuda Agreement left the determination of capacity and frequency of
services in the first instance to the designated airlines, which were to act in accordance with
predetermined guidelines. The guidelines obliged airlines to take into account each other's
interests so as not to affect unduly each other's services; capacity was primarily to be related to
traffic demand between the territories of the Contracting Parties and only secondarily to the
requirements of fifth-freedom traffic (and traffic picked up or discharged at intermediate points).
In the event of dissatisfaction with capacity and frequency of services, ex post facto review by
governmental authorities might lead to negotiations or, eventually, arbitration, See Barry
Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and Future of
Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 412, 444-47 (1975); Ralph Azzie,
Specific Problems Solved by the Negotiation of Bilateral AirAgreements, 13 MCGILL L.J. 303
(1967); Harold A. Jones, The Equation ofAviation Policy, 27 J. AiRL. &COM. 221,231 (1960);
MCGILLCENTERFOR RESEARCH OF AIR & SPACE LAW, LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-POLrrICAL
IMPUCATIONS OF CANADIAN AIR TRANSPORT 522, 545 (1980); Christer Jonnson, Sphere of
Flying: The Politics of International Aviation, 35 INT'L ORG. 273, 282 (1981) (providing a
succinct summary of the comprehensive results of the Bermuda negotiations).
" See David Field, Australia Flight Spat Is Settled, WASH. TIMEs, June 18, 1993, at C3.
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Consultations were held between the U.S. and Australian governments in
Canberra on February 8-9, 1993. " The inability of negotiations to resolve the
dispute led Australia to call for arbitration under Article 12 of the 1952
bilateral on April 1,165 and within thirty days, two of the three arbitrators had
been appointed. " On April 29, 1993, the Australian government notified the
U.S. government that, because Northwest had failed to comply with restric-
tions imposed upon fifth-freedom operations in the market, Northwest's
opportunity to serve the Osaka-Sydney route would be revoked on May 30, and
upon reapplication only two of the three weekly flights would be reauthorized,
and fifth-freedom traffic would be capped at fifty percent.
The U.S. D.O.T. found Australia's actions "an unjustifiable and unreason-
able restriction" on Northwest's exercise of rights under the bilateral. 67 It
noted that "the denial of operating authority is the maximum penalty that a
bilateral aviation partner can impose. Australia is compounding this serious
violation of an aviation agreement by unilaterally interpreting the Bermuda
capacity principles, principles that we regard as being of fundamental
importance."'" Citing the second 1998 U.S.-France Arbitration, described
above, the U.S. D.O.T. acknowledged that
countermeasures must not be clearly disproportionate to the
alleged breach in light of (1) the injuries suffered by the company
or companies concerned, and (2) the importance on the questions
of principle arising from the alleged breach .... [S]anctions
should be used with moderation and should be aimed at restoring
equality between the Parties and encouraging the parties to
continue negotiating toward a solution.'69
Finding that negotiations had failed, the U.S. D.O.T. concluded that effective
upon the date of the Australian government's restriction of Northwest's Osaka-
"' Complaint of Northwest Airlines, Inc. Against the Government of Australia, D.O.T. Order
93-2-15 (1993).
165 Australia Mulls Resolving Northwest Dispute Through Arbitration, AVIATION DAILY, Feb.
12, 1993, at 247.
'6 U.S.A. andAustralia SeekArbitration, FLIGHTIrrT'L, June 16,1993. See Abeyratne,supra
note 3, at 816.
10 D.O.T. Order, supra note 164.
'a Complaint of Northwest Airlines, Inc., Against the Government of Australia, D.O.T. Order
93-5-13 (1993).
'6 Id. at 3-4.
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Sydney service (June 30), Qantas would lose three of its ten weekly frequen-
cies in the Los Angeles-Sydney market.' 70
On June 17, 1993, the U.S. and Australian governments announced they
had reached an agreement providing that the two nations would attempt to
conclude a new bilateral by the end of the year, Northwest would be allowed
to substitute Detroit for New York on the route in question (which, given
Northwest's hub there, would generate more traffic for it than would New
York), local traffic between Osaka and Sydney would not exceed fifty percent
of the total passengers on Northwest's flights, and that the arbitration would
be aborted.17 Northwest subsequently abandoned the Osaka-Sydney route as
unprofitable. In settling the dispute, the United States avoided a decision that
likely would not have found that Northwest's presence in the market satisfied
the "primary objective" requirement.
Ill. ADJUDICATIONS BEFORE THE ICAO COUNCIL
A. The Chicago Convention
Some 188 nations-virtually the entire world community-have ratified the
Chicago Convention. Chapter XVIm of the Chicago Convention establishes
a mechanism for dispute resolution of disagreements arising between member
states on issues of interpretation of the convention or its annexes.172  If
negotiations between the governments fail to resolve the conflict, they may
submit it to the Council for decision.77 No Council member may vote on any
dispute in which it is a party. Appeals of the Council's decision may be
11' Id. at 4. See also D.O.T. Order 93-5-31 (1993) (finalizing these sanctions).
... Field, supra note 163; Australia-U.S. Aviation Sanctions Lifted, PR NEWSWiRE, June 17,
1993.
" The Chicago Convention was preceded by the Interim Agreement on International Civil
Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1516, which established the Interim Council on the Provisional
International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO), and gave it broad jurisdiction over the
settlement of aviation disputes. Article III § 6(8) thereof gave the Interim Council power to "act
as an arbitral body on any differences arising among member States relating to international civil
aviation matters which may be submitted to it." Article VII § 9 gave the Council authority to
review airport use charges and "report and make recommendations thereon. Gerald FitzGerald,
The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of
the ICAO Council, 1974 CAN. Y.B. INT'LL. 153,154-55(1974) [hereinafter ICAO Jurisdiction].
1' "[Blefore any request is filed with the ICAO Council for its decision, it is necessary for
the aggrieved Contracting States to try to settle the matter by negotiation." R.C. Hingorani,
Dispute Settlement in International Aviation, 14 ARB. J. 14, 16 (1959). See B. CHENG, supra
note 11, at 479-84.
114 Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 84; see Adam Schless, Loosening the Protectionist
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made to the International Court of Justice (ICI) or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, 175
whose decision shall be final and binding. 176
Chapter XVIII also includes some rather stringent sanctions for noncom-
pliance with decisions rendered thereunder. When the Council concludes that
an airline is not conforming to a final decision, member states shall not allow
the carrier to pass through their airspace. 177 Also, any state found in default
may have its voting powers in the Assembly suspended, a remedy so draconian
it is unlikely to ever be invoked. 7 1
The Chicago Conference also produced two additional multilateral agree-
ments providing for the exchange of traffic rights-the Transit Agreement and
the Transport Agreement.7 9 They employ identical language regarding the
Grip On International Civil Aviation, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 435, 466 (1994).
~ Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 85.
176 Id. art. 86; see Isabella Diederiks-Verschoor, The Settlement of Aviation Disputes, 20
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 335, 335 (1995) (noting that the IC has played no significant role in
resolving aviation disputes), and G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 849, 866 (1995)
(describing the ICAO dispute resolution process as "perhaps the best example" of the regime
management model in a commercially related field).
'" Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 87.
'7 Id. art. 88.
The specialized agencies, exercising as they do higher degrees of supervision
over specific patterns of transnational interaction, are in a proportionately
better position to contribute to an enforcement program [than is the United
Nations]. Since they are closer to specific value flows, they are more capable
of precipitating immediate indulgences and deprivations upon enforcement
targets. The ICAO may announce termination of landing and overflight rights
and may restrict or cancel other privileges.
Michael Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement, in 3 The Future of zhe International Legal Order
312 (C. Black & R. Falk eds., 1971) [hereinafter Sanctions and Enforcement].
179 The Chicago Conference actually drafted two additional agreements: the International Air
Services Transit Agreement, 59 Stat. 1693 (195 1), which entered into force on January 30, 1945
[hereinafter Transit Agreement], and the International Air Transport Agreement, 59 Stat. 1701
(1953) [hereinafter Transport Agreement], which has not entered into force.
The Transit Agreement provides for the privileges of: (1) flying across each contracting
state's territory and of landing for non-traffic purposes; (2) taking on passengers, mail, and cargo
destined for the territory of the state whose nationality the aircraft possesses; and (3) taking on
passengers, mail, and cargo destined for the territory of any other contracting State, and
delivering passengers, mail, and cargo coming from any such territory.
Acceptance of the Transport Agreement has been rather limited and slow. See generally
WENCESLAS J. WAGNER, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AS AFFECTED BY STATE
SOVEREIGNTY 140-43 (1970). By 1984, 95 nations had accepted the Transit Agreement, while
only 12 were parties to the Transport Agreement. By 2002, 118 nations had ratified the Transit
Agreement, while still only 12 were parties to the Transport Agreement. Status of Certain
International Air Law Instruments, I.C.A.Q. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at 36-38. Though it initially
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settlement of disputes. When a nation suffers injury under the agreements, it
may request the Council to examine the problem. The Council would then call
the parties into consultation. Should consultations fail to resolve the
controversy, the Council "may make appropriate findings and recommenda-
tions.'"8 The agreements also address disputes concerning their interpretation
or application; should negotiations between the states fail to resolve them, the
conflict resolution provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention
may be employed."'
As noted above, many of the early bilateral air transport agreements
designated the ICAO as the dispute resolution arbitral or adjudicatory forum.182
The newer agreements have largely abandoned reference to ICAO in this
capacity, although some give authority to the president of the ICAO Council
to assist in designating arbitrators. Moving away from the ICAO as a forum
for dispute-resolution, most bilaterals today call for dispute resolution via
arbitration.'83 Typically, they provide that each state selects an arbitrator, and
the two arbitrators select a third. In some bilaterals, if they cannot agree, the
third arbitrator is selected by the president of the ICAO.1 No conflict has
ever been submitted to the ICAO for arbitration, although the ICAO has helped
to designate arbitral panels on occasion.'8"
In 1957, the Council promulgated Rules for the Settlement of Differences,
which established adjudicatory procedures for disputes submitted to it under
Chapter XVIfI. 6 Significantly, Article 14 of the Rules allows the Council to
championed it, the United States withdrew from the Transport Agreement in 1946. Press
Release, Withdrawal of the United States of America, Dep't of State (July 25, 1946).
0 Transit Agreement, supra note 179, art. II, § 1; Transport Agreement, supra note 179, art.
IV, § 2.
s Transit Agreement, supra note 179, art. IV § 3.
N2 Michael Milde, Dispute Settlement in the Framework of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, in SErTLEMENT OF SPACE LAW DISPUTEs 87, 88 (Karl-Heinz B~ckstiegel ed.,
1979).
"83 Shadrach Stanleigh, "Excess Baggage" at the FAA: Analyzing the Tension between
"Open Skies" and Safety Policing in U.S. International Civil Aviation Policy, 23 BROOK. J.
INT'LL. 965, 966 (1998).
"' See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement between the United States of American and Canada,
Jan. 17, 1966, U.S.-Can. art. XV, 17 U.S.T. 201; Dennis Foerster, Caged Birds in Open Skies:
Comments on the Emergence of a Dominant Carrier, I ASPER REv. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 171
(2001).
18 Foerster, supra note 184.
16 Rules for the Settlement of Differences, ICAO Doc. 7782/2 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
Rules]. See Hingorani, supra note 173, at 15-25. The rules provide different procedures for the
handling of disagreements vis-1-vis complaints. Gerald FitzGerald, The Judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council,
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ask the parties to engage in direct negotiations at any time.1s  During such
negotiations, the formal complaint mechanism of Article 84 of the Chicago
Convention is suspended, although the Council may impose specific time
limits on the negotiations. 8 The Council may render any assistance that is
likely to facilitate successful conclusion of the negotiations, including the
designation of a conciliator." 9 Article 14 departs from the adjudicatory focus
of most of the Rules, emphasizing mediation or conciliation and the good
offices of the Council as a means of dispute resolution. 9 ° As Professor Thomas
Buergenthal has noted, "This provision indicates that the Council considers
that its main task under Article 84 of the Convention is to assist in settling,
rather than in adjudicating, disputes."'"' The ICAO has been more successful
in assisting the consensual resolution of disputes than have most of the other
organs of the UN. 92
In fact, the overwhelming number of aviation disputes between nations are
resolved informally, rather than through adjudication or arbitration. 93 Since
the promulgation of the Chicago Convention of 1944, only five disputes have
1974 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 153, 158 (1974).
187 Rules, supra note 186, art. 14(a).
188 Id. art. 14(2).
"s9 Id. art. 14(3).
9o ICAO Dispute Settlement, supra note 182, at 89. Richard N. Gariepy & David L.
Botsford, The Effectiveness of the International Civil Aviation Organization's Adjudicatory
Machinery, 42 J. AIR L. & CoM. 351, 358-59 (1976). The India-Pakistan dispute of 1952
prompted the ICAO Council to adopt rules emphasizing the use of negotiation as a means of
dispute resolution. Professor FitzGerald has noted that "[aipparently, the Council was even at
that time aware of its possible inadequacy as ajudicial body, and was reluctant to discharge the
judicial functions conferred on it by the Chicago Convention." FitzGerald, supra note 186, at
157.
191 THOMAS BuERGENTHAL, LAw-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION 136 (1969).
"9 See Garrett Hardin, Living on a Lifeboat, 24 BiOsciENcE 561 (1974) (describing the cause
of the impotence of the United Nations succinctly thus: "The United Nations is a toothless tiger,
because the signatories of the charter wanted it that way"). Former U.N. Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick expressed the failures of the agency in the arena of dispute resolution as follows:
A mediator has to be above the conflict, and the conflict-resolution machinery
at the United Nations is not above politics; it is a part of world politics. And
it is not realistic to believe that any reform of the U.N. structure is possible to
make it an effective instrument of conflict resolution.
Patricia J. Seth, The U.N. 's Midlife Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 1985, at 52.
193 See John Noyes, The Functions of Compromissory Clauses in U.S. Treaties, 34 VA. J.
INT'LL. 831, 860-61 (1994).
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been submitted to the ICAO Council for formal judicial resolution. In none of
them did the Council issue a formal decision on the merits of the case."9
B. India v. Pakistan (1952)
The first dispute submitted to the ICAO Council for adjudication was a
complaint by India against Pakistan, filed with the Council in April of 1952.195
India alleged breach of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement by
Pakistan's refusal to permit Indian aircraft to fly over its territory to and from
Afghanistan. Under the Transit Agreement, each signatory state permits
scheduled international airlines of other signatories the privilege to fly across
its territory without landing, and the privilege to land for non-traffic
purposes.' 96
Because no rules of procedure had then been promulgated, the Council
appointed a working group of three Council representatives to assist it in
devising appropriate procedures. The working group suggested, inter alia, that
the parties "enter into further direct negotiations as soon as possible with a
view to limiting to the greatest possible extent the outstanding issues."'"' By
June 1953, the parties had reached an amicable resolution of the controversy,
and so informed the Council. 198
C. United Kingdom v. Spain (1969)
The second complaint was filed by the U.K. against Spain, alleging
Chicago Convention violations by Spain's establishment of a prohibited zone
near Gibraltar."9 All the pleadings were filed while bilateral discussions
proceeded between the parties, at the UN and in other private forums. In
November 1969, the Council President reported that the parties had informed
I" Milde, supra note 182, at 90.
191 ICAO Doc. C-WP/1 169 (1952). See Report of the Council, ICAO Doc. 7367 (A7-P/1)
74-76 (1963). See generally Hingorani, supra note 173, at 16-20; B. CHENG, supra note 11, at
100-04.
'9 Transport Agreement, supra note 179. Under Article 1I § 2 thereof, disagreements may
be submitted to the ICAO Council under Chapter XVII of the Chicago Convention.
' ICAO Doc. 7291 C/845 at 162-65 (1952).
198 ICAO Doc. 7361 C/858 at 15-26 (1953); ICAO Doc. 7367 A7/P/1 74-76 (1953); 166
U.N.T.S. 3 (1953). See FitzGerald, supra note 186, at 156.
'" FitzGerald, supra note 186, at 185.
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him that they wished the complaint deferred sine die.200 Consideration was
thus deferred indefinitely. 2"
D. Pakistan v. India (1971)
The most interesting of the early disputes was perhaps the third complaint,
which made its way through the ICAO Council and was appealed to the ICJ,
filed by Pakistan against India in February 1971. It was triggered by India's
suspension of Pakistani flights over its territory after Indian nationals hijacked
an Indian aircraft, flew it to Pakistan, and blew it up, allegedly with the
complicity of the Pakistani government.
On January 30, 1971, two Indian nationals, allegedly members of the
Kashmir National Liberation Front (KNLF), hijacked an Indian aircraft en
route to Jammu, India, and diverted it to Lahore, Pakistan. Upon landing, the
twenty-eight passengers and four crew were released, but the hijackers
remained in possession of the aircraft and threatened to blow it up unless their
demands were met. The hijackers sought asylum in Pakistan and the release
of thirty-six KNLF prisoners held by India. Pakistan granted asylum to the
pair while they retained control of the plane, and allowed them to visit the
terminal by turns to receive food and contact others. India refused to release
any prisoners, and, two days after the hijacking began, the hijackers blew up
the plane as the Pakistani authorities and media looked on. The aircraft, its
cargo, and its baggage were destroyed. It took forty-eight hours after their
release by the hijackers for the passengers and crew to be returned to the
Indian border thirty-six miles from Lahore.
There has always been a great deal of tension in relations between India and
Pakistan, and this has been especially true in the volatile Kashmir and Jammu,
which occupy the extreme northern portions of both countries. The border
which the two countries share in those regions is disputed, and, despite
agreements between India and Pakistan to determine the future of the Kashmir
and Jammu regions according to the wishes of the people of those regions,
India has left its obligations under such agreements unfulfilled. As a result,
India has had to deal with terrorist activities in Kashmir and Jammu which
have been applauded, if not aided, by Pakistan. The suspension of service
ICAO Doc. 9803, c/994 27 (1969). See Milde, supra note 182.
20 Relations between the U.K. and Spain over Gibraltar continued to affect aviation relations
for decades. See Paul Dempsey, Competition in the Air: European Regulation of Commercial
Aviation, 66 J. Ant L. & CoM. 979, 1032 (2001).
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effectively isolated East and West Pakistan from feasible air transportation.
The hijacking itself was inspired by the Kashmir uprising of 1965.202
In August and September of 1965, an uprising in Kashmir fueled tensions
along the border, and the two countries engaged in armed conflict in the
region. During the conflict, which lasted almost three weeks, air traffic
between the two nations was suspended. This posed a particular hardship for
Pakistan because India's immense geographical size separated what was then
East and West Pakistan. 3 The suspension lasted until the signing of the
Tashkent Declaration in early 1966.' The declaration was intended to help
normalize relations between the two states, and, under its general terms, an
agreement was reached permitting the resumption of overflights of each
other's territories, but not permitting landings. That status quo continued until
the 1971 hijacking.
India unilaterally suspended Pakistan's overflight privileges on February
4, 1971, five days after the hijacking. Both India and Pakistan were parties to
the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement, 5 and Pakistan sought to
invoke the dispute resolution mechanisms of the ICAO Council with an
application and complaint filed with the Council. The complaint alleged vio-
lations of Article 5 of the Chicago Convention and Article I of the Transit
Agreement, which together grant contracting parties the privilege of overflying
or making non-traffic stops in the territories of other contracting parties,
whether the international air services are scheduled or unscheduled.
The proceedings before the Council ran into an early road block. India
filed a preliminary set of objections, challenging the jurisdiction of the Council
on May 28, 1971. The thrust of India's argument was that both the Chicago
I The counter-memorial of Pakistan filed with the ICJ discussed a bilateral entered into by
India and Pakistan to determine the future of Jammu and Kashmir through a fair and impartial
plebiscite. Pakistan also accused India of preventing the plebiscite from ever taking place.
Counter-Memorial of Pakistan (India v. Pak.), 1971 I.C.J. Pleadings, at 373 [hereinafter I.C.J.
Pleadings].
I When overflight privileges were unilaterally suspended by India in 1972, Pakistan was
forced to route its flights through Colombo, Sri Lanka, doubling the distance to be traveled from
approximately 1,300 nautical miles to more than 2,600. See Memorial of India, India v. Pak.,
1973 I.C.J. Pleadings, at 91.
o Tashkent Declaration, Jan. 10,1966, India-Pak., 560 U.N.T.S. 39. Mediatedby the Soviet
Union, the Tashkent Declaration required the two nations to honor a cease-fire and encouraged
cross-border dialogue. Fakiha Khan, Note, Nuking Kashmir: Legal Implications of Nuclear
Testing by Pakistan and India in the Context of the Kashmir Dispute, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 361,376-77 (2001); Brian Farrell, The Role of International Law in the Kashmir Conflict, 21
PENN ST. INT'LL REV. 293,304 (2003).
0 Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
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Convention and the Transit Agreement were suspended in 1965 between the
two states and that air traffic between them was instead governed by the
special agreement under the Tashkent Declaration. Under both the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement, the Council was given jurisdiction
over disagreements between contracting states relating to the interpretation or
application of the Convention or the Agreement respectively.' India argued
that there was no disagreement relating to the interpretation or application of
either the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement, and therefore, the
Council had no jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning the special
agreement under the Tashkent Declaration. 7
Pakistan responded that any dispute between two contracting states relating
to the "suspension" or "termination" of the Chicago Convention or the Transit
Agreement should be regarded as a disagreement relating to the "interpreta-
tion" or "application" of the Convention or Agreement, and was, therefore,
within the Council's jurisdiction. 8 In any event, the Tashkent Declaration
merely reinstated the Convention and Transit Agreement; it created no special
air transport regime.
On July 29, 1971, the Council affirmed its jurisdiction over the Pakistani
complaint. India appealed that decision to the ICJ pursuant to Article 84 of the
Chicago Convention. Proceedings before the Council were held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the appeal.
The central issue before the ICJ was whether Pakistan's complaint dis-
closed the existence of a disagreement relating to the interpretation of appli-
cation of the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement. The ICJ
characterized the issue in a liberal way, stating that the legal question was
whether or not the dispute could be resolved without any interpretation or
application of the relevant treaties at all.'0 If it could not, the ICJ concluded,
then the ICAO Council must be competent to hear the case.
India took the position that absolutely no interpretation or application of the
Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement was necessary. The two treaties
were allegedly irrelevant, because: (1) they were not in force or were
suspended between the parties; or (2) the phrase "interpretation or application"
does not include the terms "suspension" or "termination." India asserted that
the treaties were terminated or suspended either in 1965, during the outbreak
o Chicago Convention, supra note 2, arts. 84-88. Transit Agreement, supra note 180, art.
11, § 2.
Memorial of India, supra note 203, at 46.
Id. at 50.
m Id. at 62.
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of hostilities, and subsequently replaced by a special agreement under the
Tashkent Declaration, or in 1971, when Pakistan materially breached its ob-
ligations under those treaties in its actions toward the hijackers.
The ICJ responded that even India's defenses required some degree of
interpretation or application of the treaties.2"' The Court voted 14-2 to uphold
the jurisdiction of the ICAO Council to hear the case.2" India's contention
that the special agreement replaced the treaties required interpretation or
application of Articles 82 and 83 of the Chicago Convention. Article 82
requires the contracting states not to enter into obligations or understandings
inconsistent with the treaty's terms. Article 83 requires that any new
agreements which were not inconsistent with the obligations imposed by the
Chicago Convention be registered with the Council.
As to India's argument that Pakistan breached its obligations under the
treaties by its actions arising out of the 1971 hijacking, the ICJ answered that
a finding of a material breach requires a conclusion that a violation of a
provision essential to the accomplishment of the purpose of the treaty has
occurred.2 12 Such an analysis inherently required an examination of the
treaties concerned.213
Finally, the ICJ turned to India's position that the treaties were suspended
or terminated and, therefore, the dispute did not involve interpretation or ap-
plication of those treaties. Article 89 of the Chicago Convention allows a
contracting state to disregard its obligations under the Convention in times of
war or national emergency. Pakistan argued that this provision only granted
a license to ignore obligations during those special circumstances. After the
emergency or war has ended, the resumption of all obligations occurs auto-
matically. India interpreted the provision differently. The Indian viewpoint
was that the purpose of Article 89 was to make it clear that the Convention did
not affect rights the parties held under special circumstances in international
law. The ICJ concluded that the very fact that the parties disagreed as to the
provision's meaning proved the existence of a disagreement relating to the
interpretation or application of the Convention and, even if there is only one
such disputed provision, the Council is vested with jurisdiction.24 As one
210 Id. at 66.
21I Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46,
70. See Kriss E. Brown, The International Civil Aviation Organization is the Appropriate
Jurisdiction to Settle Huskit Dispute Between the United States and the European Union, 20
PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 465, 484 (2002).
212 Id. at 67.
213 Id. at 67-68.
214 Id. at 1091. See generally Herbert W. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
commentator noted, the decision makes it clear that "the unilateral denuncia-
tion of a treaty will not enable a party to escape the application of the clauses
in the treaty pertaining to the settlement of disputes relating to the treaty."2 5
The ICJ decision, issued August 18, 1972, cleared the way for consid-
eration of the merits of the case by the ICAO Council. The conflict was
essentially rendered moot when Bangladesh emerged as a new nation,
replacing East Pakistan. In July 1976, India and Pakistan issued a joint
statement discontinuing the proceedings before the ICAO Council.
2t6
E. Cuba v. United States (1998)
Relations between the United States and Cuba disintegrated once Fidel
Castro came to power, nationalized U.S. commercial interests in Cuba, aligned
Cuba with the Soviet Union, invited Soviet missiles in, and used Cuba's armed
forces to support emerging Marxist revolutionary movements in Latin America
and Africa. In the 1960s, the United States banned Cuban aircraft from U.S.
airspace, ostensibly for national security reasons. In 1988, the no-fly
prohibition was amended to allow Air Cubana to fly over New York state and
to enter U.S. airspace during inclement weather.21 7
With the collapse of the Soviet empire, the national security rationale began
to wear thin. In 1995, Cuba filed a formal complaint with the ICAO Council,
objecting to the no-fly policy against Cuban commercial aircraft as violative
of the Chicago Convention and Transit Agreement. 1 8 Clearly, it was.
Under the International Air Services Transit Agreement, signatory nations
have the right to have their commercial aircraft fly over the territory of other
signatories. For decades, U.S.-flag carriers have flown over Cuba, particularly
on flights south from the busy Miami hub. By the mid-1990s, some 120 U.S.
commercial aircraft were flying over Cuba each day, paying the Cuban
government about $6 million a year in overflight fees, but saving approxi-
mately $150 million a year in fuel and other costs than if they were forced to
avoid Cuban airspace.219 In contrast, Cubana' s flights to Toronto and Montreal
were forced to take a circuitous route some thirty minutes and 200 miles longer
than a direct route, costing it nearly half a million dollars a year.? °
Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'LL. 51, 57-61 (1974).
"tS See FitzGerald, supra note 186, at 184.
116 Milde, supra note 182.
217 Peter Kaplan, Cubans May Fly Over U.S., WASH. TIMEs, June 20, 1998, at Al.
218 Transport Agreement, supra note 180.
219 Kaplan, supra note 217.
2 Cuban Aviation Starting to Spread Its Wings, SANANTONIOEXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 2, 1996,
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Aviation relations soured again in February 1996, when the Cuban Air
Force shot down two civilian aircraft flown by a Cuban refugee group in
international airspace, killing the four Cuban Americans aboard.2"' ICAO
investigated the incident and condemned the military action as a violation of
international law.222 Nevertheless, ICAO was determined to help resolve the
overflight issue. As an ICAO spokesman noted,
We as an intergovernmental body do not get involved in disputes
between states unless asked to mediate by both sides.. .. We
have an interest in ensuring that there are harmonious relations
between member states, particularly those with contiguous
regions, and our purpose is to work to ensure that countries
continue to let civil aviation function without hindrance.223
When it became clear that, if forced to render a formal decision, the ICAO
Council would rule against it, the United States agreed to resolve the dispute
in June 1998.224 Under the ICAO-brokered agreement, Cubana would be
allowed to use two designated routes over the United States to access Canada,
and the United States would provide normal FAA air traffic control services
at cost. 22 The United States also elicited certain confidential commitments
from the Cuban government. Two hours after the agreement was signed,
Cuban airlines were allowed to fly over U.S. territory.
F. United States v. Fifteen European Nations (2000)
Though some commentators urged ICAO to take a stronger role in
economic regulatory issues,226 for its first half century, the principal disputes
at 9A [hereinafter Cuban Aviation].
221 Christoper Marquis, U.N. Faults Cuba in Plane Action, TIMEs-PICAYuNE, June 20, 1996,
at AI6.
2' Dalia Acosta, Cuba-U.S.: Back at the Negotiating Table, INTER PRESS SERvICE, Dec. 4,
1996.
223 Cuban Aviation, supra note 220.
224 Kaplan, supra note 217.
2" U.S. Allows Cuban Planes Fly to Canada, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, June 18, 1998.
226 As this author has written:
In addition to the comprehensive, but largely dormant, adjudicatory and
enforcement jurisdiction held by ICAO under Articles 84-88 of the Chicago
Convention, the agency also has a solid foundation for enhanced participation
in economic regulatory aspects of international aviation in Article 44, as well
as the Convention's Preamble. Unless it very soon assumes the role its con-
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addressed by it were of a political, rather than a commercial, nature. It first
asserted that role in its dispute-resolution capacity in a case involving an
environmental dispute with profound commercial implications-the European
effort to adopt airport noise rules that fell disproportionately hard on U.S.
airlines. This was the first dispute filed for adjudication with the ICAO
Council that involved an issue other than an airspace restriction.
Unlike North America, where airports are normally constructed on the
periphery of urban areas, European airports are usually surrounded by dense
population concentrations.227 It comes as no surprise then, that the European
Union (EU) has been among the world's leaders in efforts to restrict noise
emissions from aviation. 22 However, this leadership has often drawn criticism
from nations outside the EU, which view the noise limitations as being used
to restrict market access by non-EU carriers and to protect European aircraft
manufacturers. Yet the ECEU229 has soldiered on with its attempts to reduce
noise pollution. The EU Council's most recent action on the subject has
proven to be its most controversial yet, prompting a series of threats from the
United States, whose carriers, aircraft manufacturers, and aircraft recondition-
ing firms stood to lose considerable sums of money.230
Regulation 925/1999 established significantly more stringent standards for
noise emissions than the ICAO standards, promulgated under Annex 16 to the
Chicago Convention, demand.23" ' A full understanding of the regulation would
stitutional framers had in mind for it in 1944, the regulatory void over non-
tariff barriers in international service industries such as air transport will soon
be filled by the empire builders of UNCTAD or GAT. ICAO has the
expertise the international aviation industry needs to establish useful ground
rules to enhance the free flow of commerce. ICAO must become more deeply
involved in economic regulatory matters, lest it lose that opportunity to an
agency less well equipped to handle the complex trade problems unique to
aviation. Moreover, as a general rule, multilateral consensus is preferable to
the current regime of unilateral insistence.
PAUL DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLCY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 302 (1987).
"' Benedicte Claes, Aircrafl Noise Regulation in the European Union: The Hushkit Problem,
65 J. Am L. & CoM. 329, 341 (2000); PAuL DEMPsEY, AIRPoRT PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT: A
GLOBAL SURVEY 235-69 (2000).
28 Claes, supra note 227, at 342.
2 The European Community (EC) has transformed itself into the EU with the Treaty of
Maastricht.
3 Claes, supra note 227, at 346-47. It has been estimated that within a year of the
regulation's enactment, U.S. firms lost $2.1 billion in cancelled orders for such things as
hushkits and spare parts, and suffered a deleterious impact on accelerated air fleet depreciation.
Id.
231 Council Regulation (EC) 925/1999, 1999 O.J. (L115).
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require an elaborate explanation of the technical aspects of ICAO noise
emission standards.232 Suffice it to say that aircraft are divided into four
categories termed Chapters 1,2, 3, and 4, after the relevant chapters of Volume
I, Part II of Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, third
edition.233 Chapters 3 and 4 set considerably higher standards for reducing
aircraft noise than Chapters 1 and 2.234 Most Member States independently
banned Chapter 1 aircraft in 1988,235 while the EU Council banned Chapter 2
aircraft in 1990.1 6 However, nothing in these earlier efforts at limiting aircraft
noise prevented a carrier from reconditioning its aircraft or changing their
operating profile and then having them "recertificated" as meeting the
standards of Chapters 3 or 4." As a result, many carriers took these less
expensive options of "hushkitting" their aircraft rather than scrapping their
non-compliant aircraft.
The EU was displeased by these less-than-absolute measures, for while the
reconditioned aircraft met the Chapter 3 standards, they were still not as quiet
as newer aircraft specifically manufactured to meet those standards.238
Therefore, Regulation 925/1999 was drafted with a particular eye towards
closing this loophole. The regulation sets a baseline for evaluating aircraft by
defining a "civil subsonic jet aeroplane" as one with a maximum take-off
weight of 34,000 kg or with nineteen or more passenger seats, and with an
engine "by-pass ratio" of more than three-to-one.239 The by-pass ratio is the
232 See Claes, supra note 227 (containing detailed discussion of how aircraft noise is
measured and classified under the ICAO's standards). See also Kriss E. Brown, The
International Civil Aviation Organization Is the Appropriate Jurisdiction to Settle Hushkit
Dispute Between the United States and the European Union, 20 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 465
(2002).
233 Council Regulation (EC) 925/1999, supra note 231, at pmbl. 5.
234 Claes, supra note 227, at 339-40.
'3 Id. at 339. Chapter 1 includes such aircraft as the Boeing 707, the Hawker Siddeley
Trident, and the A6ospatiale Caravelle. Id at 339-40.
1 Council Directive 89/629/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L363) 27; Chapter 2 includes the Boeing 727,
early models of the Boeing 737, and early models of the McDonnell Douglas DC-9. Claes,
supra note 227, at 333-34.
, Reconditioning is done in one of two ways. The aircraft's existing engines may be
modified through the use of a "hushkit" or, in a process called "re-engining" the engines may
be entirely stripped and replaced with engines having a higher rating. Changing an aircraft's
operating profile means altering the way the aircraft is operated, such as not loading it to full
capacity, flying only to airports at particular elevations, flying only during certain times of day,
etc.
23S Council Regulation (EC) 925/1999, supra note 231, at pmbl. 15.
I d. art. 2(1). Please note that there is an error in the text of the regulation as published,
which states that the aircraft must have a by-pass ratio of less than three, however a full reading
of the regulation and other relevant sources makes clear that it must be greater than three.
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volume of air drawn into the engine compared to the volume of air actually
used in the fuel burning process.2" (This technical detail became the focus of
the EU-U.S. dispute.) The regulation defines "recertificated civil subsonic jet
aeroplane" as those meeting the size requirements laid out above, but which
were initially designed to meet Chapters 1 or 2 noise restrictions and have
subsequently been reconditioned or placed under operational restrictions in
order to comply with Chapter 3 limits."'
The regulation barred member states from registering recertificated aircraft
after April 1, 1999, although recertificated aircraft registered as of that date
would not be stripped of their registration provided that they have remained
continuously registered in a Member State. 2 Recertificated aircraft that are
registered in a Member State could not be operated within the EU as of April
1, 2002, unless they had operated in the EU prior to April 1, 1999.243
Furthermore, as of April 1, 2002, recertificated aircraft registered outside the
EU would not be permitted to fly to airports in the EU unless they had been on
the register of their home country as of April 1, 1999, and had operated in the
EU between April 1, 1995, and April 1, 1999.' There are certain exemptions,
however, which Member States may grant, including for emergencies and
other conditions of "an exceptional nature," as well as for aircraft that operate
exclusively outside of the EU's territory. 5 The regulation also does not apply
to the overseas possessions of the Member States.2'
Northwest Airlines, which had invested most heavily in "hushkitting,"
rather than replacing, its aging fleet, would be hit hardest.2 7 On January 15,
20 Claes, supra note 227, at 331 n.10.
241 Council Regulation (EC) 925/1999, supra note 231, art. 2(2). However, if an aircraft has
been "re-engined" and its new engines meet the three-to-one bypass ratio it will not be
considered as being recertificated, but will instead be treated like an aircraft which was initially
designed to meet Chapter 3 standards. Id.
242 Id. art. 3(1)-(2).
243 Id. art. 3(4).
24 Id. art. 3(3). The date requirements in Article 3(3) appear to be designed to prevent
carriers whose home territories are far from the EU from transferring older short-range aircraft,
which would not have been able to reach the EU ordinarily, to carriers based on the EU's
periphery.
245 Id. art. 4(l)-(2).
246 Id. art. 5.
247 The massive debt burden imposed by the Alfred Checchi $4 billion leveraged buy-out of
Northwest made it difficult for the airline to retire aging aircraft. Paul Dempsey & Laurence
Gesell, AIRINEMANAGEMENT: STRATEGIESFORTHE21STCENTURY 122-24 (1997). Northwest
opted instead to hushkit and refurbish all its DC-9s whose average age was then twenty-four
years, so as to be able to fly them another fifteen years. Susan Carey, Northwest Airlines Plans
to Renovate Some DC-9s Rather than Replace Them, WAIL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1994, at A2. As a
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1999, Northwest filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Transportation
under the Federal Aviation Act 248 against the EU Council and fifteen member
states against the hushkit rules. 9 The United States filed a formal Article 84
complaint with ICAO against the fifteen EU member states (for the EU itself
is not formally an ICAO member) on March 14, 2000.250 EU Transport
Commissioner Loyola de Palacio responded by stating that by inaugurating the
ICAO formal complaint mechanism, the United States had made resolution of
result of hushkitting and new aircraft cancellations, by the dawn of the Twenty-First Century,
Northwest Airlines had the oldest fleet of aircraft of any major airline by a significant margin,
surpassing even TWA's fleet for that ignoble distinction. In 1991, Northwest's fleet was thirty-
five percent older than the industry's average; by 1998, Northwest's fleet was sixty percent older
than the industry's average. According to the 2001 Global Fleet Handbook, Northwest continues
to have the oldest fleet of any major U.S. airline, at a geriatric 20.4 years. Fleet Study Sees
Overcapacity, Aging Planes at Northwest, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 27, 2001, at 3.
248 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (2000) (providing remedies under U.S. law against foreign
discriminatory practices).
249 Complaint of Northwest Airlines, Inc., Against the Council of the European Union and
the 15 Member States, D.O.T. Order 99-1-10 (1999). Northwest argued that the rules constituted
an "unjustifiable or unreasonable . . . practice against an air carrier" and "imposes an
unjustifiable or unreasonable restriction on access of an air carrier to a foreign market." The
D.O.T. deferred reaching the merits while negotiations between the governments took their
course. D.O.T. Order 2001-11-18 (2001).
o U.S. Files Formal Complaint Over Hushkit Rule, WEEKLY Bus. OF AVIATION, Mar. 20,
2000, at 131. The thrust of the U.S. complaint was as follows:
[Tihe regulation raised various questions concerning its compatibility with
the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) and the
international noise standards established pursuant to the Convention. Most
notably, the regulation does not rely on performance standards (that is, how
much noise an aircraft actually makes) as its basis for imposing restrictions.
Rather, the regulation's restrictions affect only specified aircraft and engine
technology and equipment, without reference to noise levels .... [T]he
technology and equipment affected by the regulation-including
"hushkits'-are largely products of U.S. companies, and the aircraft
employing the affected equipment are largely owned and operated by U.S.
airlines. Furthermore, the regulation does not affect all aircraft utilizing the
specified technology. Certain aircraft registered in, or having a history of
operating into, Europe are not affected by the regulation.... [The condi-
tions for exemption from the regulation's restrictions gave preference to
aircraft that remained on a registry of any EU member state during the
relevant period, and therefore . . . the regulation ran afoul of Chicago
Convention provisions prohibiting contracting states from discriminating
among aircraft on the basis of state of nationality.
Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
Admissibility of US-EU "Hushkits" Dispute Before the ICAO, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 410, 410-11
(2001).
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the dispute more difficult and compromised development of Stage 4
standards.251
The dispute between the EU and the United States stemmed principally
from Regulation 925/1999's use of an aircraft's engine by-pass ratio to
evaluate its noise emission status rather than directly imposing a standard of
how much noise an aircraft can emit. The EU argued that the engine by-pass
ratio is an appropriate measure of the loudness of an aircraft and is less
subjective than setting a specific decibel level, as decibel levels can vary
according to environmental conditions. 2 The United States countered that
there are aircraft models with by-pass ratios less than those prescribed by the
regulation which have lower noise emissions than aircraft that are capable of
meeting the regulation's standards. 3 The issue of protectionism for European
manufacturers was also raised by the United States, as U.S.-based corporations
are the only suppliers of hushkits, and many of the engine models produced by
U.S. manufacturer Pratt & Whitney do not meet the by-pass ratio
requirement.5
The EU agreed to delay implementation of Regulation 925/1999 by one
year to give U.S. carriers an opportunity to eliminate more of their non-
compliant aircraft through attrition or advanced re-engining rather than
scrapping them. 5 Yet postponing its implementation was deemed by many
observers as unlikely to forestall the U.S. government from taking some form
of retaliatory action, either unilaterally or multilaterally through the ICAO
and/or the WTO. The United States chose to resist the EU over such a
seemingly minor issue because it was widely believed in the aviation
community that Regulation 925/1999 represented a first step towards banning
all Chapter 3 aircraft," which would encompass a majority of the fleets of
U.S. carriers. The EU did nothing to assuage the fears of U.S. carriers or
manufacturers, but rather was pressing for revising the Chicago Convention to
increase the stringency of noise limitation standards.257
The EU member states responded to the U.S. complaint on July 18th with
preliminary objections, alleging:
2' U.S. ICAO Complaint Complicates Hushkit Dispute Resolution, EU Says, AvIATION
DAILY, Mar. 16, 2000, at 2, available at 2000 WL 9301904.
252 Tom Gill, Europe Breaks Rank on Noise, AnuriE Bus., Apr. 1999, at 32.
,3 Claes, supra note 227, at 369.
' Gill, supra note 252, at 32.
25 Colin Baker, The Next Chapter, AnutNE Bus., Mar. 2000, at 54.
m' Id. at 55-56.
25 Id.
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* The U.S. is asking the ICAO Council to deviate from its past
practice and go beyond its proper function as set out in Article
84 of the Convention. Its request must be rejected as inadmissi-
ble.
* The Respondent objects that the ICAO Council is not a court of
equity with wide ranging general jurisdiction. It can only rule
on disagreements concerning the application and interpretation
of the Convention and its Annexes, not order States to take any
action that it "deems proper and just."
* The Respondent underlines its commitment to seeking a
resolution of the differences underlying this dispute within
ICAO and reiterates its willingness to enter into negotiations
with the U.S. for the purpose of resolving this dispute.
* As a consequence, the ICAO Council has no jurisdiction to
handle the matter presented by the Applicant.258
A senior U.S. official responded by saying, "This is a weak attempt to delay
the inevitable-that the EU's ban is wrong and must be overturned."" 9 After
receiving written briefs from both parties, hearing oral argument, and
permitting voting members of the Council to question the agents for the
parties, on November 16, 2000, the ICAO Council rendered its decision on the
preliminary objections.' The Council voted 26-0 in favor of the United
States.2" The three principal objections were handled as follows:
Absence of Adequate Negotiations. The EU argued that, "[a]lthough the
Parties have held technical discussions on the Regulation and the need for
stricter noise standards in ICAO, none of the questions of interpretation and
application of the Convention raised by the U.S. in its Memorial have been
discussed" 2 in formal negotiations between the parties, as is required by
28 Preliminary Objections Presented by the Member States of the European Union,
Disagreement Arising Under the Convention on International Civil Aviation Done at Chicago,
Dec. 7, 1944, at 2, para. 7 [hereinafter EU Preliminary Objections].
259 European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum to Resolve Noise Dispute, WORLD AIRPORTWK.,
Aug. 29, 2000. Another source revealed that the EU's allegation that the United States had
failed to adequately negotiate with the EU to resolve the dispute "particularly grates." European
Union Rejects ICAO as Forum for Hushkit Disputes, WORLD AIRLNE NEWS, Aug. 18, 2000.
260 Decision of the ICAO Council on the Preliminary Objections in the Matter United States
and 15 European States, Nov. 16, 2000 [hereinafter ICAO Council Decision]. The United
States was represented by David Newman of the Legal Advisors Office of the U.S. Department,
whose thirty-minute rebuttal to the EU's one and a half hour argument carried the day.
' Murphy, supra note 250, at 411-14; see also Claes, supra note 227, at 339.
26 European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum for Hushkit Disputes, supra note 259.
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Article 84 of the Chicago Convention 26 as a condition precedent for instituting
the Council's quasi-judicial dispute resolution procedures. According to the
EU, the "ICAO Council should not, in Article 84 proceedings, be asked to
adjudicate political disputes between individual contracting states." 2"
The United States responded that, in fact, it had raised these issues with the
EU member states before filing its complaint, and had engaged in negotiations
on these issues for more than three years. Further, the United States pointed
out that the ICAO Rules for the Settlement of Differences, simply require a
party filing a dispute to assert that "negotiations to settle the disagreement had
taken place between the parties but were not successful. 265
On this point, the ICAO Council found that the exhibits submitted by the
parties established that the negotiations between them fulfilled the require-
ments for filing a dispute before it. The ICAO Council therefore denied the
EU's first objection.
Failure to Exhaust Local Remedies. Second, the EU argued that the United
States was not bringing this case because it was concerned about the noise
situation around EU airports or the operation of European civil aviation
services, but instead because it claimed that the Regulation "targets" U.S.
owners and manufacturers of aircraft, jet engines and hushkits; however, these
parties have local remedies available to them in the EU member states which
they have not exhausted. The United States responded that "the local remedies
rule applies only to claims brought by a state on behalf of its nationals, where
injury to the state is derivative; it does not apply to claims of direct injury to
a state for violation of an international agreement. ' '26
The ICAO Council concluded that the United States was not required to
exhaust local remedies, since it sought "to protect not only its nationals, but
also its own legal position under the Convention. "267 Moreover, the Council
found that the exhaustion of local remedies was not a condition precedent to
filing a dispute before the ICAO Council.
Scope of the Relief Requested. Third, the EU argued that the United States
was "seeking to create new obligations under the Convention going beyond
what has been agreed between the parties and to impose on the Respondent
263 Article 84 of the Chicago Convention provides, in relevant part: "If any disagreement
between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this
Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any
State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council."
264 European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum to Resolve Noise Dispute, supra note 259.
Rules, supra note 186, art. 2, ICAO Doc. 7782/2.
2 Murphy, supra note 250.
267 Id. at 412.
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obligations that have not been contracted."2 This was an incorrect applica-
tion of Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, according to the EU, and should
be dismissed as inadmissible. The United States responded that the ICAO
Council was indeed competent to fashion such relief, but that in any event, the
EU's objection was not preliminary in nature and need not be ruled upon by
the Council until it had resolved the merits of the case.269 The ICAO Council
agreed with the United States that this objection was not preliminary, and
therefore deferred judgment until it reached the merits.
Following the Council's decision, the EU Member States did not exercise
their right to appeal it to the International Court of Justice. They instead filed
their countermemorial on December 2.270 The Council's order had invited the
parties to resume negotiations to resolve the dispute, which they agreed to do,
with the facilitation of the ICAO Legal Counsel, Dr. Ludwig Weber. ICAO
Council President Dr. Assad Kotaite brought his "good offices" to bear on the
problem. With Dr. Kotaite flying between Washington and Brussels, and after
protracted negotiations, the dispute was diffused with an agreement between
the United States and EU concluded at ICAO's Montreal headquarters in
October 2001027 The United States formally withdrew its ICAO complaint
following the EU's repeal of the noise regulations in April 2002, though it
pursued its complaint against Belgium, which had imposed a flight curfew at
Brussels. 2 The EU, however, objected to the withdrawal unless Belgium
were included, so the U.S. withdrawal of the complaint was aborted. After the
EU revoked the noise regulation on December 30,2002. The EU then notified
Belgium that its noise regulations were inconsistent with Community law and
threatened to bring suit before the EU Court of Justice. Belgium subsequently
formally declared the law would not be applied, and the United States settled
the dispute with all fifteen EU Member States on December 6, 2003. It is no
wonder that ICAO has been described as "among the most quietly effective
international organizations." 2"
26 European Union Rejects ICAO as Forum for Hushkit Disputes, supra note 259.
2 id.
210 Murphy, supra note 250, at 412.
2" Business Briefs, SEATFL. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2001, at E3. See Council President Acts as
Dispute Conciliator, Meets with High-Lever Authorities Over Noise Regulation, http://www.
icao.int/icao/enjr/5602_up.htm (last visited July 16, 2003).
272 U.S. Drops Hushkit Complaint, Pursues Case Against Belgium, AVIATION DAILY, June
14, 2002, at 2.
273 David Marcella, Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine
for Application in the World Court, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 120 (1999).
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Though the ICAO Council addressed important procedural questions, it is
unfortunate that the Council failed to rule on the central issue-whether ICAO
environmental standards establish the maximum requirements that may be
imposed, or whether they are a minimum that can be enhanced by individual
governments. The issue has profound importance in all areas of ICAO
competence, including safety, navigation, and security.274 Believing that
consensus is the most effective way to resolve differences between nations,
ICAO Council President Kotaite established an ad hoc working group he
named "Friends of the President" to attempt to reach consensus regarding
noise issues. He appointed delegates from Belgium, France and the United
Kingdom and several other nations to the group. In October 2001, the ICAO
General Assembly adopted by consensus the Friends' recommendation of a
"balanced approach" to airport noise in Resolution A33-7, calling upon
member States to identify the noise problem and resolve it by achieving the
maximum environmental benefit in the most cost-effective manner. It calls
upon States to assess: (1) source reduction; (2) land use planning and
management; (3) noise abatement operational procedures; and (4) operating
restrictions.275 Operating restrictions upon aircraft are to be imposed only after
"such action is supported by a prior assessment of anticipated benefits and of
possible adverse impacts. 276 States are encouraged to refrain from imposing
operating restrictions on aircraft that comply with Volume 1, Chapter 4 of
Annex 16.2" This effectively requires that deference be given by national and
local governments and airports to ICAO noise standards.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The International Court of Justice has made important contributions to
dispute resolution. One source observed that
as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations: (1) [the ICJ]
is a factor and actor in the maintenance of international peace and
security; (2) it is the most authoritative interpreter of the legal
obligations of states in disputes between them; (3) it has acted as
274 U.S. security requirements imposed upon foreign airlines and airports, for example, are
far more stringent than those imposed by ICAO. See Paul Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role
of Law in the War Against Terrorism, 41 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649 (2003).
275 ICAO Ass. Res. A33-7 Appendix C. Airport Noise: Transport Council Adopts New
Hushkits Legislation, EUROPE ENVmoNMENT, Apr. 9, 2002.
276 ICAO Ass. Res. A33-7 Appendix D.
277 id.
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the supreme interpreter of the United Nations Charter; and (4) it
is the only truly universal judicial body of general jurisdiction.2 3
However, jurisdiction of the ICJ is only reluctantly conferred by states and
is frequently avoided.279 Though ICAO has nearly universal jurisdiction, a
relatively small number of states accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ. 0 In ten of the twelve aviation disputes brought before the ICJ, the Court
concluded it had no jurisdiction over the parties, and dismissed the cases. In
only one of the twelve cases (i.e., Libya v. United States (1992)) did the ICJ
reach the merits of the complaint.
A. The Cold War Cases
In the 1950s, the United States filed six cases with the ICJ against the
Soviet Union, and its allies (Czechoslovakia and Hungary), alleging armed
attacks by Warsaw Pact military aircraft against U.S. military aircraft. 23'
Because none of the respondents had submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ,
all of these complaints were dismissed.282 It is unclear why the United States
continued to file them, given the ICJ's unwillingness to accept jurisdiction.
Perhaps the United States wanted to expose the lawlessness of its Communist
adversaries in the court of world public opinion.
On July 27, 1955, an El Al civilian aircraft en route from Vienna to Tel
Aviv departed from its flight path and entered Bulgarian air space where it was
shot down by Bulgarian military aircraft, killing all fifty-eight persons on
board. Declaring the attack "a grave violation of accepted principles of
" Peter Bekker, The 1998 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 534, 536 (1999); see generally THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT THE
CROSSROADS (Lori Damrosch ed., 1987).
279 See Jonathan Charney, Coampromissory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'LL. 855 (1987); Daniel Hylton, Default Breakdown: The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties' Inadequate Framework on Reservations, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 419 (1994).
0 Douglas Ende, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court Of
Justice: A Proposal for a New United States Declaration, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1145 (1986).
281 Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952 (United States v. U.S.S.R.), 1956 ICJ 9 (Order of Mar.
14); Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954 (United States v. U.S.S.R.), 1958 ICJ 158 (Order of
Dec. 9); Aerial Incident of 7 November 1954 (United States v. U.S.S.R.), 1959 ICJ 276 (Order
of Oct. 7); Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of America (United
States v. Hung., United States v. U.S.S.R.); Aerial Incident of 10 March 1953 (United States v.
Czech.), 1956 ICJ 6 (Order of Mar. 14).
2"2 Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1445, 1460-61 (1985).
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international law," the United States, U.K. and Israel brought complaints
before the ICJ.2" 3 The Court dismissed the claims for want of jurisdiction. 2"s
More than three decades would elapse before the ICJ was again asked to
adjudicate an aviation dispute.
B. Libya v. United States (1992)
The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft requires that control of a hijacked aircraft be restored to the aircraft
commander and passengers be permitted to continue their journey." 5 The
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft declares
hijacking to be an international "offense" and requires the state to which an
aircraft is hijacked to extradite or exert jurisdiction over the hijacker and
prosecute him, imposing "severe penalties" if he is found guilty.2" 6 The
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation expands the definition of "offense" to include communications of
false information and unlawful acts against aircraft or air navigation facilities,
and requires prosecution thereof. Under each convention, contracting parties
are obligated to punish the described offenses by "severe penalties,""2 7 take
"such measures as may be necessary" to establish their jurisdiction over the
offense and its parties,"8 take the individual into custody,28 9 make a prelimi-
"I Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg.), 1959 ICJ 127 (Judgment of May 26); Aerial
Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.K. v. Bulg.), 1960 ICJ 264 (Order of Aug. 3); Aerial Incident of 27
July 1955 (United States v. Bulg.), 1960 ICJ 146 (Order of May 30).
284 Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg.), Preliminary Objections, 1959 ICJ 127
(Judgment of May 26). See Andreas Lowenfeld, The Downing of Iran Air 655: Looking Back
and Looking Ahead, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 336, 339 (1989).
285 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14,
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, reprinted in 58 AM. J. INT'LL. 566 (1964) [hereinafter
Tokyo Convention]. All subsequent citations are to the materials reprinted.
6 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T.
1641, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
2 Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 2; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1974, 24 U.S.T. 565, 10 I.L.M. 1151
[hereinafter Montreal Convention].
' Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 4; Montreal Convention, supra note 287, art. 5.
289 Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 6(1); Montreal Convention, supra note 287, art.
6(1).
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nary inquiry into the facts,2" and notify the perpetrator's state of nationality.29" '
Additionally, the provision regarding prosecution requires:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offense was
committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
ordinary offense of a serious nature under the laws of that
State.292
All three conventions require that disputes between contracting states be
resolved first by negotiation, then by arbitration, and, on appeal, by the ICJ.293
Contracting states are required to report promptly to ICAO any information
regarding the circumstances of offenses, the action they took to return the
aircraft and to facilitate continuation of the passengers' journey, and the results
of any extradition or other legal proceedings. 29
The Hague and Montreal Conventions have been criticized for their
ambiguity.295 The provisions regarding sanctions for aircraft hijacking and
other unlawful offenses do not actually require prosecution or extradition;
rather, they impose an obligation only to present the case to the appropriate
authorities who decide, at their discretion, whether prosecution is
appropriate.'" There is no uniformity in state actions regarding prosecution
I Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 6(2); Montreal Convention, supra note 287, art.
6(2).
9 Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 6(4); Montreal Convention, supra note 287, art.
6(4).
292 Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 7; Montreal Convention, supra note 287, art. 7.
2 Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 12(1); Montreal Convention, supra note 287, art.
14. See Paul Dempsey, The Role of the International Civil Aviation Organization on Deregula-
tion, Discrimination, and Dispute Resolution, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 529, 558-71 (1987).
' Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 11; Montreal Convention, supra note 287, art. 13.
295 Claude Emanuelli, Legal Aspects ofAerial Terrorism: The Piecemeal vs. the Comprehen-
sive Approach, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 503, 510-11 (1975); Mark E. Fingerman, Comment,
Skyjacking and the Bonn Declaration of 1978: Sanctions Applicable to Recalcitrant Nations,
10 CAL. W. INr'LL.J. 123, 127 (1980); Ruben Kraiem, Recent Developments, 19 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1037, 1041 (1978).
296 R.I.R. Abeyratne, The Effects of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation on World
Peace and Social Order, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 450,487-88 (1995); Dionigi Fiorita, Aviation Security:
Have All the Questions Been Answered? 20 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 69, 88 (1995).
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or extradition,2 97 and the failure of the conventions to define the term "severe
penalties" has enabled several states to avoid rigorous punishment of
skyjackers, particularly those persons deemed to be political refugees.2 98 This
allows states to comply with the literal requirements of the conventions, while
doing little to discourage the proscribed offenses.2
One case that illustrates the practical deficiencies of the Montreal
Convention of 1971 is Libya v. United States.' Libya brought the case
against the United States on grounds that the United States had breached the
requirement for arbitration of disputes arising under the Montreal Convention.
The facts involved the attempt of the United States to bring to justice two
Libyan nationals who had allegedly put a bomb aboard the Pan Am 103 flight
that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. The Montreal Convention required
Libya either to prosecute or extradite those committing an offense that destroys
civil aircraft. Libya contended that it was prosecuting the alleged perpetrators
under its domestic law. It also relied on Article 14, which provides that any
dispute over the interpretation or application of the Convention that cannot be
settled by negotiation should be submitted to arbitration. The United States
and the U.K. insisted that Libya promptly surrender the suspects for trial to
British authorities, disclose all it knew about the crime, and pay appropriate
compensation. Libya asked the ICJ both to promptly take provisional
measures to preserve the rights of Libya and to order the United States to cease
and desist in its violations of the Montreal Convention and in its threats of the
use of force against Libya.30 1
Technically, it appeared that Libya had complied with the Convention and
the United States had not. The United States, however, was convinced that the
Libyan government was involved in the criminal act; hence, the United States
would not accept Libya's willingness to prosecute the suspects. The United
States persuaded the U.N. Security Council to weigh in on the issue, and the
Security Council issued two resolutions of relevance. Resolution 731 noted the
297 R.I.R. Abeyratne, Some Recommendations for a New Legal and Regulatory Structure for
the Management of the Offense of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation, 25 TRANSP. L.J.
115, 116(1998). Dr. Abeyratne identifies four problems with the Conventions: (1) not enough
states are signatories; (2) there is no enforcement provision; (3) most political offenses are
exempt from extradition; and (4) the obligations to search for and arrest suspects are not
sufficiently rigorous. Id. at 119.
298 Mark E. Fingerman, Comment, Skyjacking and the Bonn Declaration of 1978: Sanctions
Applicable to Recalcitrant Nations, 10 CAL W. INT'LL.J. 123, 128 (1980); Kraiem, supra note
295, at 1041.
9 Fingerman, supra note 298, at 127-28.
3 31 I.L.M. 662 (1992).
301 Id.
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Security Council's concern about the persistence of acts of international
terrorism in which states are directly involved, illegal activities against
international civil aviation, and the investigation of the Lockerbie explosion
that implicated officials of the Libyan government. The resolution also urged
Libya to cooperate fully in establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts
against Pan Am 103.302 Several weeks later, the Security Council issued
Resolution 748, which demanded that Libya immediately comply with the
obligations set forth in Resolution 731 and cease and desist from all forms of
terrorist acts. 3
The ICJ examined U.S. behavior in light of these two resolutions and found
that, under Article 25 of the UN Charter, both Libya and the United States
were obligated to carry out the decisions of the Security Council. The ICJ
found that these obligations "prevail over their obligations under any other
international agreement, including the Montreal Convention."3' Therefore,
the relief that Libya requested was denied.
It took years of Security Council sanctions" 5 against Libya to persuade it
to surrender the two suspects to the U.K. for trial before a Scottish court in the
Netherlands. The court found that Pan Am 103 had been brought down by
plastic explosives in a Toshiba radio cassette player within a suitcase checked
from Malta via Frankfurt by Al Megrahi. ' He was head of airline security,
and had been involved in military procurement for the Libyan Jamahariya
Security Organization (JSO). °7 Mr. Megrahi had entered Malta under an alias,
U.N. Security Council Res. 731 (Jan. 21, 1992).
303 U.N. Security Council Res. 748 (Mar. 31, 1992). Further, Resolution 731 provided that
all states should prohibit aircraft originating from or destined to Libya from taking off from,
landing in, or overflying their own territory. U.N. Security Council Res. 731 (Jan. 21, 1992).
States were required to prohibit their nationals from supplying Libya with aircraft or aircraft
components, aviation engineering or maintenance, certifications of airworthiness for Libyan
aircraft, or payment on insurance contracts or provisions of new insurance for Libyan aircraft.
U.N. Security Council Res. 748 (Mar. 31, 1992).
Libya v. United States, at 142.
o U.N. Security Council Res. 883 (Nov. 11, 1993) expressed concern about the "continued
failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of
terrorism, and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and effectively to the request
and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), constitute a threat to international peace
and security." The Security Council therefore called upon states to freeze Libyan funds and
financial resources, close all Libyan Airlines airports in their territories, prohibit its commercial
transactions, and refuse to provide Libya with aircraft, component parts, aviation engineering,
training, or insurance. See also U.N. Security Council Res. 1192 (Aug. 27, 1998).
3 Her Majesty's Advocate v. Al Megrahi, 40 I.L.M. 582 (High Court of Justiciary at Camp
Zeist, The Netherlands, Jan. 31, 2001).
1 JSO was subsequently renamed the External Security Organization.
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purchased clothing there that was packed in the suitcase with the explosive
device, and associated with members of the JSO and Libyan military who had
purchased MST-13 timers, one of which detonated the bomb over Lockerbie,
Scotland." In 2002, Libya offered to accept responsibility for the explosion
of Pan Ann 103 over Lockerbie, and pay its victims $5 million each (or $10
million each if the United States lifted sanctions against it within eight
months).
C. Iran v. United States (1996)
Mistaking it for a military aircraft, the U.S.S. Vincennes fired missiles
which brought down Iran Air flight 655 Airbus 300 commercial aircraft shortly
after taking off from Bandar Abbas on July 3, 1988, en route to Mecca, Saudi
Arabia. All 290 passengers and crew aboard the civilian aircraft were killed.
Five years earlier, on September 1, 1983, Soviet military aircraft shot down
a civilian airliner that had strayed over its territory-Korean Airlines flight
007-killing all 269 persons aboard. In 1984, after ICAO conducted an
investigation3 into the incident, the ICAO Assembly unanimously adopted
one of the few amendments to the Chicago Convention, Article 3 bis, which
essentially restated a customary principle of international law: "every State
must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight
and... in case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of
aircraft must not be endangered."3t Paradoxically, the Soviet Union decried
the destruction of Iran Air flight 655 as a "terrorist act" and a "monstrous
crime." 311
The Vincennes had been on patrol with as many as sixteen U.S. Navy
vessels and of British, French, and Italian warships protecting oil tankers from
attack during the prolonged Iran/Iraq war.312 On May 17, 1987, an Iraqi Air
Force F-I Mirage fired on the U.S.S. Stark, mistaking it for an Iranian frigate.
Her Majesty's Advocate v. Al Megrahi, at 582.
The Chicago Convention authorizes the ICAO Council to investigate, upon request, "any
situation which may appear to present avoidable obstacles to the development of international
air navigation; and after such investigation, issue such reports as may appear to it desirable."
Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at art. 55(e).
30 ICAO: Amendment of Convention on International Civil Aviation with Regard to
Interception of Civil Aircraft, May 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 705, 706.
"' John Deverell,Aftermath of a Tragedy: Bloody Rage and Power Politics, TORONTO STAR,
July 9, 1988, at D1.
312 Id.
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According to one source, this apparently prompted the U.S. Navy to adopt a
"shoot first and verify the kill later" rule of engagement.31 3
Iran Air flight 655 had never been a military threat to U.S. naval forces in
the Persian Gulf, but was mistaken for an F-14 undertaking an armed attack by
crew members under "combat-induced stress."3a ' Until minutes before the
missile launch, military transmissions from the Vincennes warning the
incoming aircraft had not been received by Iran Air 655, for they had been
broadcast on military frequencies. 31 5
Shortly after the incident, Iran asked ICAO to conduct a complete
investigation. On March 17, 1989, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution
encouraging all states to "take necessary action for civil aircraft navigation
safety, particularly by assuring effective coordination of civil and military
activities." It also reminded states of the general principle of international law
requiring them to refrain from using force against civil aircraft, and encour-
aged states to ratify Article 3 bis.316
Dissatisfied with what it perceived to be velvet glove treatment given the
United States by ICAO, exactly two months later, Iran brought an action
against the U.S. government before the ICJ, on grounds that the destruction of
the civilian aircraft was both a violation of the Chicago Convention and the
Montreal Convention of 1971.317
The United States was on weak legal grounds. Article 51 of the UN
Charter allows an act of self defense "if an armed attack occurs." Here, no
such attack actually occurred, and evidence held by the U.S. Navy in
presuming one was about to occur was thin.1 Moreover, the perceived attack
was not on U.S. soil, over which it could claim sovereignty," 9 but on a U.S.
vessel. Not only was the U.S. legal case poor, its moral position was
miserable. Though relations between the two governments collapsed with the
" Sompong Sucharitkul, Procedure for the Protection of Civil Aircraft in Flight, 16 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 513, 517 (1994).
"' David, supra note 273, at 83 n.5.
115 Lowenfeld, supra note 284, at 336.
316 Sucharitkul, supra note 313, at 532.
317 Concerning the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. United States), 1989 I.C.J. 132
(Dec. 13) [hereinafter Iran-United States Aerial Incident]. The disposition of the complaint by
ICAO was not to Iran's satisfaction, and prompted the ICJ filing. Stephen Schwebel, The
Performance and Prospects of the World Court, 6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 253,261 (1994).
311 See Sucharitkul, supra note 313, at 528.
9 Under Article I of the Chicago Convention, "every State has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
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unlawful seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and holding U.S. citizens
hostage for months on end,32 the killing of civilians was indefensible.
On February 22, 1996, the two governments informed the ICJ that they had
agreed to discontinue the case because they had concluded "an agreement in
full and final settlement of all disputes, differences, claims, counterclaims and
matters directly or indirectly raised by or capable of arising out of, or directly
or indirectly related to or connected with, this case. '32 1 With the out-of-court
settlement between the parties, the case was dismissed. The ICJ never reached
the merits of the dispute, which would likely have been resolved in Iran's
favor.
Under the terms of the settlement, no compensation technically was paid
by the United States to the Iranian government. However, shortly after the
incident, President Reagan had offered ex gratis payments by the U.S.
government to families of the victims of approximately $300,000 per family.322
320 The 1978 United States v. France Arbitral Accord had barely been decided when events
in Iran gave the U.S. government a first-hand opportunity to put into practice the legal
enforcement devices apparently approved by the United States v. France Tribunal. The Shah
had been deposed in a revolution by Islamic fundamentalists, and when the former monarch was
admitted to the United States for medical treatment, religious zealots protested by seizing fifty-
two Americans in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and holding them hostage. Worldwide appeals
for release of the hostages were unavailing.
On November 14, 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter declared a national emergency and
ordered the blocking of all Iranian governmental property in the United States. Executive Order
No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979). On November 29th, the United States
brought the case to the ICJ. The World Court handed down a unanimous interim decision
ordering the hostages freed. Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (United States v. Iran), 19 I.L.M. 139 (1980). In addition to freezing governmental
assets, the United States severed all diplomatic and trade relations with Iran. On April 24, 1980,
a commando raid to rescue the hostages was aborted when U.S. helicopters collided on the
ground near Tehran. On May 24, the ICJ, although decrying the use of force while legal action
was pending, again decided unanimously that the hostages should be released. Case Concerning
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(May 24), at 44. See Michael Koehler, Two Nations, A Treaty, and the World Court: An
Analysis of United States-Iranian Relations Under the Treaty ofAmity Before the International
Court of Justice, 18 WIS. INT'LL.J. 287, 297 (2000).
321 Iran-U.S. Aerial Incident, supra note 317, 3 VII 88 (ICJ Order 13 XII 89, at 132. The
agreement also settled claims filed by Iran before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal concerning
banking matters. Alexander Watson, State Department Briefing, FED. NEWS SERvCE, Feb. 22,
1996 [hereinafter Watson Briefing].
31 Watson Briefing, supra note 321. In 1997, payments totaling $29 million were authorized
to be paid to the surviving family members of 125 who perished aboard the flight. William J.
Clinton, Statement by Bill Clinton on Iran, U.S. NEWSWIRE (May 14, 1997).
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D. Pakistan v. India (2000)
On September 21, 1999, Pakistan filed a complaint against India in the ICJ
for India's destruction of a Pakistani military aircraft, allegedly over Pakistani
territory.323 Pakistan argued that both it and India had accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice. Specifically, Pakistan argued that British India had
acceded to the General Act for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of
1928. India argued that the General Act was no longer in force, referred to
institutions such as the League of Nations that were no longer in existence, and
argued that, in any event, India has never deemed itself subject to that
legislation since her independence either by succession or otherwise. India
also insisted that under Article 36(2) of the statute, it had included a reserva-
tion excluding the jurisdiction of the court as to disputes involving India and
any other state which "is or has been a member of the [British] Commonwealth
of Nations. 324
By a vote of 14-2, the ICJ found that it was unclear whether the General
Act of 1928 survived the demise of the League of Nations. 25 Though the U.K.
had acceded to the General Act, India was not a party at the time the instant
complaint was filed, and therefore it provided no basis for jurisdiction.
Further, under its reservation to Article 36, India had reserved jurisdiction over
disputes with other British Commonwealth nations (which includes Pakistan).
The ICJ therefore dismissed the complaint. 26 Though the opinion cautioned
the parties to resolve their disputes peacefully, the result is that the ICJ is
powerless to resolve any of the intractable issues between Pakistan and India,
including the contentious territorial dispute over Kashmir. Though the ICJ had
earlier ruled that the ICAO Council could hear aviation disputes between the
two nations, the Chicago Convention is limited in its application to civil, and
not state, aircraft.327 Hence, the destruction of a military aircraft could not be
brought before ICAO for adjudication.
323 Pieter H. F. Bekker et al., Public International Law: International Courts and Tribunals,
35 INT'LL. 595 (2001).
'24 Id. at 598.
" Peter H.F. Bekker, Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 707, 708-09 (2000); Detra Chandler, Developments at the International Court of Justice 7
NEW ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 199, 202-03 (2001).
" Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Press
Communique 2000/10bis (June 21, 2000). John Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, International
Court of Justice Declines Jurisdiction in Pakistan/India Dispute, 6 INT'L L. UPDATE (Aug.
2000).
31 Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A. Political Means of Dispute Resolution
Political or diplomatic (and sometimes, coercive) methods are the ones
most commonly employed in resolving international disputes. These include
a variety of communications and consensual efforts to resolve controversies
between governments, including exchanges of notes, formal and informal
diplomatic discussions, consultations, and negotiations. They often provide
an amicable avenue for exploring the differences of positions and achieving
some compromise mutually acceptable to both parties. When this occurs, the
solution selected is more likely to be long-lived.
But there are significant disadvantages to dispute resolution by political
means. First, where the states have unequal bargaining power, "might makes
right"; the nation in the strongest bargaining position will usually prevail on
the major issues, even where an objective evaluation would not result in a
conclusion that it stood in the most compelling legal or equitable position. 28
Winning an aviation dispute may be less important, for example, than
prevailing on an issue in a more important commercial sphere or preserving
political relationships. Second, good negotiators are taught to ask for more
than they want or need, so that they have some room in which to bargain. This
overstating of issues and positions tends to distort truth and may itself
exacerbate the conflict between the governments. Third, if a solution is
achieved, it may be neither as objective nor as impartial as one which would
be rendered by a third party, but may instead reflect relative bargaining
leverage or distorted reality.
Some of these difficulties can be diminished if a neutral third party,
whether a state or an international organization, such as ICAO, provides its
good offices to assist the parties in achieving a satisfactory resolution of the
dispute, and/or performs inquiry, mediation, and conciliation.329 The advan-
328 See generally Louis Sohn, The Role of Arbitration in Recent International Multilateral
Treaties, 23 VA. J. INT'LL.J. 171,171-72 (1983).
32 See 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 8-20 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952)
[hereinafter Lauterpacht]. Good offices can be distinguished from mediation in that the former
consists of various efforts to encourage negotiations between the parties, while the latter consists
of the direct conduct of such negotiations on the basis of proposals submitted by the mediator.
Id. at 10. Conciliation is defined as "the process of settling a dispute by referring it to a
commission of persons whose task it is to elucidate the facts (usually after hearing the parties and
endeavoring to bring them to an agreement) to make a report containing proposals for settlement,
but which does not have the binding character of an award of judgment." Id. at 12.
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tages of informal third-party assistance are several: (a) it avoids any deleteri-
ous impact upon the authority and autonomy of the nations involved that might
arise by imposing unwelcome binding decisions upon them; (b) although
arbitration and adjudication require a concentrated focus on the resolution of
specific factual and legal issues, mediation, conciliation, and good offices are
not so constrained, and the inquiry can proceed in whatever direction the
parties prefer, including a comprehensive evaluation of all aviation grievances
between the two governments; and (c) a consensual solution is likely to be
longer-lived than one imposed by third parties through legal means.3 ICAO
has been exceptionally successful in using its good offices to resolve and
diffuse conflicts brought before it.
As noted above, the most commonly employed method of settling
international disputes is via political means: informal and/or formal diplomatic
consultations and negotiations with foreign governments. If political or legal
means fail to resolve the dispute, the ultimate alternative is coercion or threat
thereof, including reprisals and retaliation. 31 Sanctions have also been
threatened to encourage hard bargaining or to force the submission of the
dispute to arbitration (as was the case in the second United States v. France
arbitration, and the Australia v. United States arbitration). Hence, various
combinations of political, legal, and coercive means may be tailored to the
particular controversy to secure a satisfactory resolution. Moreover, the ex-
haustion of political methods of dispute resolution is a condition precedent to
the utilization of legal methods of dispute resolution: arbitration or adjudica-
tion.
B. Legal Means of Dispute Resolution
Highly prophetic were the words of Professor John Cobb Cooper, written
in 1947:
In the exercise of its sovereignty every nation has the right (as
well as the duty itself) to develop its air power, as represented in
part by its air transport, to the extent needed by its domestic and
foreign commerce and other legitimate objectives. But some-
3 Gerald P. McGinley, Ordering a Savage Society: A Study of International Disputes and
a ProposalforAchieving Their Peaceful Resolution, 25 HARV. INT'LL. J. 43,71-72 (1984). See
generally Vratislave Pechota, Complementary Structures of Third-Party Settlement of
International Disputes, in DispurESErrLEai THRouGHTHEUNrrED NATIONS 149 (Kventaka
Raman ed., 1977).
33 Lauterpacht, supra note 329.
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where an impartial forum must exist in which the legitimacy of
these objectives can be challenged by other nations directly
concerned. The development of air transport of one nation may
injuriously affect another or cause a dangerous dispute. Again
there must be a forum and machinery to remedy such a situation.
World organization may well require sufficient international
control so that air transport does not become an instrument of
unfair nationalistic economic competition or political aggression
and thus the source of serious international misunderstanding and
dangerous ill feeling. 32
For the most part, legal means have played only a limited role in dispute
resolution. States have resisted turning over their conflicts to third parties,33 a
despite the widespread pressure of mandatory arbitration clauses in bilaterals
and the existence of international organizations with adjudicatory powers. 34
As we have seen, only six aviation disputes have been submitted to arbitration
(United States v. France (1964); United States v. Italy (1965); United States
v. France (1978); Belgium v. Ireland (1981); United States v. United Kingdom
(1992), and Australia v. United States (1993)), and only five have been
submitted to ICAO for resolution (India v. Pakistan (1952); United Kingdom
v. Spain (1969); Pakistan v. India (1971); Cuba v. United States (1998); and
United States v. Fifteen European Nations (2000)). A dozen were submitted
to the ICJ.
Note that in all aviation arbitrations but one (Australia v. United States
(1993)), the arbitration panel issued a decision addressing the merits of the
complaint. In none of the disputes formally submitted to ICAO did the
Council render a decision on the merits,33 though ICAO successfully brokered
several dispute resolutions informally. In ten cases, the ICJ was unable to
render a decision on the merits because it lacked jurisdiction over the
respondent. In only one aviation case (Libya v. United States (1992)), did the
ICJ render a decision on the merits of the complaint, though in other cases it
332 JOHN C. COOPER, THE RIGHT TO FLY 192-93 (1947).
333 Bilder, supra note 109, at 1-2; JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFucr 97-99 (2d ed. 1959).
331 See generally Martin Domke, The Settlement of Disputes in International Agencies, 1
ARB. J. 145 (1946); K. OEUERS-FRAHM & N. WUILER, DisPuTE SETTLEMENT IN PuBuc
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984).
133 Both ICAO and the ICJ rendered opinions in the second Pakistan v. India (1971) dispute.
In this case, the ICJ was asked by India to assess the question of jurisdictional competence of
ICAO, which was upheld by the ICJ.
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rendered decisions on procedural and jurisdictional questions. It is likely that
the ICJ would have reached the merits in Iran v. United States (1998), if the
United States had not settled the case on the courthouse steps. This suggests
that parties should seek arbitration if they really want to have a decision that
defines their legal rights and responsibilities. If, instead, they want the dispute
resolved through conciliation and mediation without a formal decision, they
should submit their complaint to ICAO. Unless the states are willing to submit
the dispute to the ICJ, it is unlikely to be able to address the merits.
Absent a treaty commitment, states are under no customary international
legal obligation to refer their disputes to an arbitral or adjudicatory forum.33 6
Ordinarily, the bilateral air transport agreement dispute settlement provisions
provide the opportunity for binding arbitration on issues arising under the
bilateral. The near-universal ratification of the Chicago Convention provides
the vehicle for dispute resolution by the ICAO Council. But most nations have
exerted reservations to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. In the absence of a treaty
commitment, the customary practice of the world community is to allow each
nation unilaterally to resolve interpretative questions arising as a result of its
treaty commitments."' Whatever constraints or inhibitions there may be on
arbitrary decision making are those which exist for all of international law:
"common interest, policed by need for reciprocity and fear of retaliation." '338
The reasons why nations are reluctant to resort to legal means of dispute
resolution are numerous.339 Some may be unwilling to tender the question to
336 Lauterpacht, supra note 329, at 22; Bernard Oxman, Complementary Agreements and
Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 277, 284 (2001).
331 See Brian Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L.
REv. 257 (2000) (advancing the idea of a multilateral agreement on mandatory arbitration,
including the waiver of sovereign immunity to facilitate direct actions by airlines against foreign
governments). Professor Havel provides an interesting constitutional argument for surrendering
sovereignty to a multinational legal regime. This is a rather breathtaking proposal, given that
commercial aviation disputes have historically been resolved by government to government
negotiation and arbitration. Additionally, governments do not submit themselves to potential
liability lightly.
338 M. MCDoUGALET AL, THE INTERPRETATION OFAGREEMENTs AND WORLD PUBUC ORDER
8 (1967); see also FISHER, IMPROviNG COMPUANCE WrH TERATIONALLAw 127-40 (1982).
331 Professor Bilder points out that even where a party believes itself to be in a strong legal
and equitable position, it may be reluctant to submit the question to binding arbitration or
adjudication because of the uncertainty of the result: "No matter how careful the parties are
selecting arbitrators or judges, no matter what the judges' reputations, any judge may simply fail
to understand an issue, have unconscious biases, try to avoid responsibility by compromising,
or simply reach a wrong decision." Bilder, supra note 109, at 4. In the international legal order
"[u]nilateral remedies are the norm, and each state has first to rely on its own forces. Resort to
courts and tribunals is exceptional, not only, as often said, because the judicial settlement of
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a third party for fear of an adverse resolution. Although legal methods offer
a means of securing an answer to a controversial legal question, the answer
may not be the one that a participant would prefer to hear.3"
Similarly, a nation in a superior bargaining position may have that strength
seriously diluted if the dispute is submitted to a neutral third party, an
advantage it may not wish to lose. Others may object to the perceived absence
of bias in the decisional tribunal,34 or the dearth of precedent or clear legal
norms to govern the decision makers.342 Moreover, the actual underlying cause
of the dispute may differ from the legal issue that is submitted to arbitration or
adjudication.3 3 Thus, the tribunal may be focusing on an ostensibly important
legal question when the real friction between the governments arises in a
political or economic dimension. Still other nations "may be concerned about
the expense, inconvenience, and delay involved in arbitral or international
court proceedings, lack of familiarity with international court procedures, or
uncertainty regarding the enforceability of any eventual judgment." 3" Hence,
many governments prefer the give-and-take of consultations and negotiations
in which a consensual resolution is pursued.
Between the two primary alternatives of third-party dispute resolution,
arbitration has several advantages over adjudication in the settlement of inter-
national conflicts. These include a more expeditious and economical
resolution of the issues (owing in part to the informality of their procedures,
which is itself an independent advantage of arbitration), the privacy of
proceedings (which avoids the potential embarrassment of focused media
attention), and greater input in the selection of decision makers.345 Moreover,
most bilaterals include explicit arbitration clauses which require the submis-
disputes is not compulsory, but also because resort to courts and tribunals is not always the most
appropriate means to settle disputes." ZoLIER, supra note 97, at 4.
" Bilder, supra note 109, at 4. See generally L21uAN RANDOIPH, THIRD-PARTY
SuE ENT OF DIsPUrES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 41-42 (1973).
141 See generally M. McDoUGAL ET AL. supra note 338, at 258-60; see Paul Larsen, The
United States-Italy Air Transport Arbitration: Problems of Treaty Interpretation and
Enforcement, 61 AM. J INT'L L. 496, 517 (1967) (noting that the ICAO Council has been
criticized as being ill-suited to arbitration or adjudication, because of the fact that its membership
is comprised of the political representatives of member states).
342 Bilder, supra note 109, at 3.
343 Id. at 4, 6.
34 Id. at 3.
35 Larsen, supra note 341, at 498-99; McGinley, supra note 330, at 70. A nation as
prosperous as the United States may have an advantage in judicial forums by virtue of the vast
resources of legal talent in its departments of State and Transportation that it can commit to the
case.
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sion of disputes to an arbitral panel, once consultation and negotiation
alternatives have failed to resolve the dispute; this is an advantage over at-
tempting to secure jurisdiction over recalcitrant nations before an international
adjudicatory body, such as the ICJ. As one commentator noted: "The primary
problem confronting both the Permanent Court of International Justice under
the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice under the United
Nations has been the reluctance of nations to submit themselves to the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of either court."'34" Indeed, nations rarely invoke the
jurisdiction of the ICJ, and as we saw in the Cold War Cases and Pakistan v.
India disputes, several have rejected its jurisdiction."'
Although the ICAO Council has been designated as a potential forum for
both arbitration and adjudication, international aviation disputes have rarely
been brought before it, even though 181 nations-virtually the entire world
community-have ratified the Chicago Convention, and are therefore subject
to its dispute resolution requirements. Moreover, that Convention conferred
upon the agency strong enforcement powers of voting suspension and
revocation of air transit rights for delinquent members.348
' Harold J. Owen, Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: A Study
of Its Acceptance by Nations, 3 GA. L. REV. 704, 704 (1969).
" McGinley, supra note 330, at 44-45. Professor McGinley has succinctly summarized
some of the principal reasons why many states are reluctant to consent to ICJ decision-making:
[Tihis lack of success [can be attributed] to a variety of factors, including a
pro-Western bias in the substantive law applied by the judges; the inability to
predict the outcome of any case submitted to the Court due to the sketchy
nature of international law itself; a fear of losing and the impact that such loss
would have on the status and reputation of the state in question; the political
bias of the judges or their inability to deal adequately with the complex
matters raised by international disputes; the expense, delay, and the often
unwelcome publicity invoked in airing a dispute before the Court.
These weaknesses, however, merely reflect a deeper problem-that the
Court's institutionalized dispute resolution process does not fit the social
order in which it functions .... [The ICJ] represents an institutionalized
dispute settlement process developed in relatively sophisticated, homoge-
neous, domestic societies; yet the Court operates in an international com-
munity which in terms of its social cohesion and its authority-power structure
is essentially diverse and primitive in nature.
Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted).
I Articles 87 and 88 of the Chicago Convention provide that the ICAO Assembly may
suspend the voting rights of any member which fails to conform with an arbitral decision or of
the ICJ; where the ICAO Council determines that an airline is not conforming to a decision of
the ICJ or arbitral body, member states must suspend their operations in their territory. 15
U.N.T.S. 92 (1944). Oscar Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral
Decisions, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 24 (1960).
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There are many reasons why so few disputes have been submitted to the
ICAO Council for adjudication under Chapter XVm of the Chicago Conven-
tion. First and foremost is the nature of the Council itself.49 The principal
difficulty of utilizing ICAO as an adjudicatory tribunal is its political
composition. As Dr. Edward Warner, first President of the ICAO Council,
noted, "No international agency composed of representatives of states could
be expected to bring judicial detachment to the consideration of particular
cases in which large national interests are involved. ' '3' The Council is a
political body comprised of governmental representatives appointed for their
technical, administrative or diplomatic skills, or indeed, their political
relationships in their home country, rather than their legal abilities.35' Hence,
they do not possess that measure of dispassionate independence and autonomy
of an unbiased neutral decision maker that one normally expects of a judge.352
For example, during the second Pakistan v. India proceeding, several Council
members requested postponement of a vote while they consulted their
respective governments to obtain instructions.353 Despite the fact that Council
3" One commentator has noted that "the ICAO Convention contains its own, somewhat
unusual, partially political, and arguably awkward dispute settlement procedures that are both
apparently compulsory and little used .. " Bernard H. Oxman, Complementary Agreements
and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 277, 277 (2001).
3" Edward Warner, The Chicago Air Conference, 23 FOR. AFF. 406, 415 (1945).
351 THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION 123-24, 195 (Richard B. Ullich ed., 1969).
312 Prof. Michael Milde has noted:
Mhe Council of ICAO cannot be considered as a suitable body for adju-
dication in the proper sense of the word-i.e., settlement of disputes by
judges and solely on the basis of respect for law. The Council is composed
of States (not independent individuals) and its decisions would always be
based on policy and equity considerations rather than purely legal
grounds....
Truly legal disputes (recognized by States concerned as being purely legal)
can be settled only by a true judicial body which can bring into the procedure
full judicial detachment, independence and expertise. The under-employed
ICJ is the most suitable body for such type[s] of disputes.
Milde, supra note 182, at 95 (emphasis in original).
3 Id at 90. As Professor FitzGerald has eloquently noted:
In the case of the ICAO Council, the persons sitting on the bench are
demonstrably the national representatives of the respective member states.
They are not, for the purposes of considering disagreements or complaints,
divested of their character as national representatives. Hence, there is at the
outset a contradiction in the ICAO procedure for the settlement of disputes
which provides that representatives of states sitting as such will be called
upon to act in a judicial capacity. Indeed, a perusal of the minutes of the
Council meetings of July 28-29, 1971, shows that some of the members
[Vol. 32:231
DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
members may act under the direction of their respective governments, they
have shown themselves capable of reaching a decision, as reflected most
recently in the United States v. Fifteen European Nations case.
Beyond the problem of the absence of an impartial decision maker is the
potential cost of lengthy adjudicatory proceedings in consumption of parties'
time and money.354 The sheer size of today's ICAO Council (36 members, as
of 2003) would suggest the likelihood of a lengthy evidentiary and decisional
process, and the nightmare of a plethora of separate and conflicting opinions."'
wanted to defer decisions because they wished to await instructions from their
governments. Other representatives had already apparently received their
instructions....
In short, it is a contradiction in terms to say that a state can be a judge. It
is also a contradiction to hold that a representative who receives instructions
from a state as to how he should act with respect to a particular disagreement
could be seen to act judicially.
Id.
Gerald FitzGerald, The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Appeal
Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, 1974 CAN. Y.B. INT'LL. 153, 168-69 (1974)
(citations omitted). In the postwar euphoria in which the Chicago Convention was concluded,
it was no doubt anticipated that the world community would cooperate on the basis of man's
higher virtues and aspirations. But nations, being creations of man, reflect the full spectrum of
human strengths and weaknesses. Hence, the assumptions upon which adjudicatory jurisdiction
was conferred to ICAO may have been specious.
" BUERGENTHAL, supra note 351, at 124.
35 See Havel, supra note 337, at 257, in which Professor Havel points out that ICAO has
pitifully little dispute resolution experience on which to draw. Actually, the early bilateral air
transport agreements referred to ICAO as the forum for dispute resolution, as does the Chicago
Convention, and ICAO Council has been formally asked to adjudicate several. Dissatisfaction
with ICAO as a judicial forum led nations to insert an arbitration clause in their bilateral now
the near universal means of dealing with bilateral air transport agreement problems that cannot
be resolved in negotiations between governments. With respect to arbitrations between
governments on commercial aviation issues, there have been several. Professor Havel points out
that "with globalization... the technical and jurisprudential absurdity of trying to straightjacket
the international aviation, space and telecommunications industries with domestic legal systems
will become increasingly obvious." Brian Havel, International Instruments in Air, Space and
Telecommunications Law: The Need for a Mandatory Supranational Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, in INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION,
ARBrrRATION IN AIR, SPACE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 11, 56 (Kluwer ed. 2002). His case
would have been strengthened had he discussed why the arbitrations or adjudications discussed
herein were unsatisfactory means of dispute resolution, why bilateral consultations and
negotiations between governments on commercial aviation issues do not provide an adequate
remedy, or why unilateral sanctions (as actual or threatened tariff or route suspension, or
countervailing tariffs, as the United States has imposed on occasion) do not facilitate satisfactory
dispute resolution.
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Although ICAO has been given comprehensive adjudicatory powers by
virtue of the Chicago Convention, and wide-ranging arbitral powers under a
plethora of bilaterals,356 it has exhibited no enthusiasm for exercising either,
preferring instead to use its good offices to bring the parties to a resolution of
the dispute.357 In each of the five cases filed, delay in the proceedings and/or
ICAO's role in conciliation and mediation has enabled the parties to resolve
the controversy. The 1957 rules suggest a preference for consultations and ne-
gotiations rather than adjudication and sanctions. Mediation, conciliation, and
the prudent use of good offices are sometimes the more efficient and effective
means of conflict resolution, and the ones preferred by the ICAO itself.35s Of
course, the existence of Chapter XVIm's adjudicatory machinery may itself
encourage nations to resolve their disputes amicably.359 It undoubtedly gives
the Council additional leverage in its efforts at mediation and conciliation.36
However, some commentators argue that ICAO's dispute resolution mech-
anism ought to be employed to deal with problems of economic discrimination
in international aviation. Dr. Gertler has noted that, despite ICAO' s shortcom-
ings:
it is not quite understandable why States have not approached the
ICAO concerning some discriminatory practices, such as
complaints over landing fees, given the clear mandate of Article
35 For example, Article 9 of Bermuda I provided that "any dispute between the contracting
parties relating to the interpretation or application of this agreement or its annex which cannot
be settled through consultation shall be referred for advisory report to the Interim Council of the
(ICAO]." Article III § 6(8) of the Interim Agreement gave the Council authority to act "as an
arbitral body on any differences arising among member states relating to international civil
aviation matters." News & Notes, British-U.S. Agreement on Air Transpon Disputes, 1 ARB.
J. 37 (1946).
357 B. CHENG, supra note 11, at 460.
3.8 MILDE, supra note 182, at 94; Gariepy & Botsford, supra note 190, at 351,358-59. The
final chapter in John Murphy's recent book recommends that the United Nations also be
employed as a forum for dispute resolution principally via negotiations. conciliation, and similar
means. J. Murphy. The United Nations and the Control of International Violence (1982). For
a review of the role the U.N. has played in employing good offices for the resolution of
international conflicts, see Vratislav Pechora, A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the
United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace, in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT THROUGH
THE UNrTED NATIONS 577 (Kuentaka Raman ed., 1977).
... Milde, supra note 182, at 94; Gariepy & Botsford, supra note 190, at 351, 359, 361-62.
360 Gariepy & Botsford, supra note 190, at 361-62. "When the Council invites the parties to
enter into further negotiations, for example, it is rather difficult for them to decline such an
invitation, for there is always the possibility--real or imagined-that this uncompromising
stance might affect the Council's decision in the case." BUERGENTHAL, supra note 351, at 195.
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15 of the Convention. By precedent setting decision making, the
ICAO Council could achieve more significant progress towards
an orderly flow of international air transport commerce than is
possible in isolated bilateral contexts through unilateral national
protective measures.36
Another source insists, "[tihe ICAO must be the organization to maintain a
cohesive policy in an industry that must transcend boundaries to fully realize
its potential." '362 Now that it has broken the mold of serving only as a forum
for disputes over airspace, and taken on conflicts in the commercial and
environmental sphere, perhaps it can become a forum for resolving a wider
variety of aviation conflicts, even though the ultimate resolution may be
nonjudicial in form.
361 Gertler, supra note 29, at 51, 83-84.
3 Brown, supra note 232, at 465, 482.
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